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THE CRIMES

OF THE

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1667

HOUSE OF HAPSBURG

AGAINST

ITS OWN LIEGE SUBJECTS.

BY

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
A D V E R T I S E M E N T.

THE following pages had been compiled to be published in a channel in which the writer's name would have been superfluous. I now think it proper to avow myself, not because there is here any original research, for there is none; but to guarantee, in some degree, to the reader, that the statement of broad facts is faithful. Original research is excellent in calm times; but after the recent horrors, it is but reasonable to trust more to the standard historians than to any new researches concerning ancient affairs. In respect to them, I have acted the part of a mere extractor and abridger from common books, chiefly from Archdeacon Coxe's House of Austria, Robertson's Charles V., and Grattan's History of the Netherlands. On the recent events I will only say, that I have taken pains to inform myself aright from various sources. The Hungarian facts are now quite beyond dispute, and the Austrian organs are wise enough to avoid the argument.

FRANCIS W. NEWMAN.

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THE CRIMES
OF THE
HOUSE OF AUSTRIA
AGAINST ITS OWN LIEGE SUBJECTS.

I.—WHAT IS POLITICAL CRIME ?

FROM causes which we cannot here stop to analyze, neither Religion nor Philosophy has succeeded in carrying private morality into public life. All great empires have been born in crime. Every dynasty, and every republic, lies open to so many grave imputations, that official men and soldiers are apt to look on princes and statesmen, like the gods of Paganism, as free from moral restraints. Since war has become a profession, a few of its atrocities have been lessened ; but if we except this, the morality of international statesmanship in general is no higher now than among the old Greeks and Romans. In such a state of things it may seem absurd to censure any one power in particular.

Nor do we for a moment imagine that in any class of political crime, the House of Austria is the sole offender. The House of Bourbon preceded it in personal wickednesses ; the House of Bonaparte seems anxious not to be behind it ; the House of Stuart tried to imitate it, but failed ; the petty tyrants of Germany and Italy have been often as criminal. But the Hapsburg princes have been signal for the extraordinary number of similar offences, and the high development of the freedom which they crushed. Among them it is not one preternaturally wicked man who has done the foul deeds, and left a clear field to the

dynasty : many treacherous emperors of the Austrian House have been personally amiable. We do not overlook the fact, that the guilt of kings is shared by their ministers ; though it is impossible to exculpate a monarch from the acts of his servants, when those servants are not imposed on him by a parliament, but are maintained by him against the people and its organs. When a wicked policy is hereditary in a court, and sustains itself under better and worse princes alike, this is the greatest of all testimonies that the dynasty is incurably evil.

Does some reader forbid us to bring the deeds of statesmen to the tests of pure religion or refined philosophy ? Well : let us then try them by the notions of old Paganism. Let it be imagined for a moment, that every nation is allowed to treat foreigners as a natural prey,—that there is no moral bond pre-existing between nation and nation, or primitively between family and family,—but that all moral obligation rises out of *treaties, oaths, and laws*. The Greek Xenophon, travelling through a foreign country, urged his comrades not to make treaties of amity with the people, because this would be an obstacle to replenishing the soldiers' empty pockets by slaughter and plunder. Who will say that Xenophon's code of morality was too elevated to apply to the princes of our age, and to their Jesuit instructors ? No beginning of national life, ever so rude, is possible, without some sense that Law and Oaths are sacred, and eminently *those oaths* which are taken by an official Protector. The crime which history charges against the House of Austria, is not merely that they have waged unjust and cruel wars against foreigners, (that is guilt too common here to touch;) but that having been freely accepted to protect the laws and liberties of a large number of nations, they have in every instance played the part of a guardian who murders his ward. Such a charge does not take for granted that in every controversy between a King and a Nation the king is necessarily alone in the wrong ; but solely that no lawlessness of individuals will justify the official guardian of the laws in extinguishing law. The House of Hapsburg was the constitutional ruler over nations once the freest in Europe : over Austria, the Netherlands, Castile, Aragon, Sicily, Bohemia, Hungary, the German empire ;—to say nothing of Lombardy and Polish Galicia, which were conquered provinces. In every instance except Sicily (which after all is no real exception) the Austrian dynasty flagrantly betrayed its solemn trust ; and,—generally by open violence and perfidious ferocity, else by gradual encroachments,—has annihilated the fundamental compact on which its royal

dignity was founded. Such a tissue of conduct, even in the judgment of a Greek, or Punic, or Roman heathen was impious and execrable crime. The holders of power so gained were regarded as self-outlawed,—hateful to gods, and deserving of no defence from men. We proceed to give some details of these events.

II.—RISE OF THE HOUSE OF AUSTRIA.

THE eminence of the House of Austria begins with the celebrated Rudolf, count of Hapsburg, who was elected King of the Romans, (or heir-presumptive to the German empire,) in 1273, and shortly after, emperor; a high dignity which at that time bound together the Sovereign States of Germany, much as the United States of America are now bound together by their Congress and President. The emperor was elected for life, yet the tendency was always strong to elect continually out of the same royal house; and the great energy with which Rudolf rescued Germany from the licence of anarchical barons, was rewarded by the permanent elevation of his descendants.

These princes, like all others, encroached and invaded wherever they were able, and with no small success:—using their hereditary dominions to support their imperial pretensions, and their imperial powers to extend their hereditary authority. But the vast aggrandizement of the House of Austria has depended, primarily upon royal marriages, and secondarily, upon dread of the Turks.

1. A well-known Latin epigram celebrated the matrimonial alliances of the House of Hapsburg in the following words:

“ Wars, let others wage! but thou, lucky Austria, marry!
For the kingdoms which Mars gives to others, Venus gives to thee.”

This, as history, is strictly true, which will appear from the following summary.—Mary of Burgundy, sole daughter of Charles the Rash, was only eighteen when her father was slain, who was sovereign of the Netherlands, Burgundy, Artois, and Franche Comté. Immediately after, she gave her hand and kingdom (in 1477) to the Austrian Maximilian, afterwards Emperor, first of that name.—The elective crowns of Bohemia and of Hungary had been united in one sovereign. The kingdom of Bohemia included Moravia, Silesia and Lusatia; the dependencies of Hungary were Bosnia, Servia, Croatia, Sclavonia, Transylvania,

part of Wallachia, and Moldavia. Various treaties and family compacts (wholly invalid in law) had been made between the House of Austria and the Bohemo-Hungarian dynasty, to favour the union of all the crowns; and alarm of the Turks made this desire natural and venial in the eastern powers, which had to bear the brunt of their attack. Maximilian induced Ladislaus, king of Hungary and Bohemia, to contract a double marriage with the House of Hapsburg, by the union of Louis and Anne, son and daughter of Ladislaus, to two of Maximilian's grandchildren. This marriage was indeed opposed by the elective king of Poland, Sigismund, brother of Ladislaus; but Maximilian constrained his assent by giving *another* granddaughter in marriage to Christian II., king of Denmark, Norway and Sweden; as also by intrigues with the Teutonic knights and with the Grand Duke of Muscovy.—Moreover, in the second year of his imperial authority, Maximilian, being a widower, had disgusted the German sovereigns by marrying the sister of the Duke of Milan, for the sake of her large dowry, and for the chances of adding the Milanese to the dominions of his family. So well did he understand the weapons of his warfare.

Meanwhile the crowns of south-western Europe were similarly consolidated. Sardinia had been conquered by a king of Aragon. The throne of Sicily, being vacant, was first filled by a prince of Aragon, with the goodwill of the Sicilians; next, on his premature death, a tacit union of the crowns of Sicily and Aragon took place in 1412, after the King of Aragon had expressly stipulated that *the separate constitution and independence of Sicily* should be preserved. Ferdinand of Aragon, inheriting both crowns, married Isabella, queen of Castile; and thus strengthened, conquered the rest of Spain and the kingdom of Naples, so as to unite under his throne all Spain, Sardinia, Sicily, and half of Italy.

Joanna, daughter of Ferdinand and Isabella, was married to Philip the Handsome, son of Maximilian and of Mary of Burgundy. By this union, the crowns of Spain, Sicily and Naples were added to the House of Hapsburg. The sons born of the marriage were Charles of Ghent and Ferdinand the First of Hapsburg. Charles inherited the thrones of two grandfathers and two grandmothers, and was elected emperor of Germany. Ferdinand became archduke of Austria by his brother's affection, and was elected to the crowns of Bohemia, Hungary, and at length of Germany, in consequence of the terror which the Turks inspired. This deserves a few words of explanation.

2. Despotism which is transitional often performs the task of

blending the heterogeneous elements of a nation, and fusing it into a single nationality, out of which grows patriotism and strength. But all history testifies that permanent despotism causes decay. We must not, then, wonder that the Turkish power, now so despised, was dreadful to all Europe three and four centuries ago. Its actual resources of men and of wealth have declined, while those of Christendom have vastly increased ; moreover, its own belief in its destiny has received the severest moral wounds.

Louis, king of Hungary and Bohemia, fell with the flower of the Hungarian nobility by the arms of Solyman the Magnificent, in the fatal battle of Mohacs, Aug. 29th, 1526. The moral effect on all Europe was immense. Dread of the Turks over-powered in the minds of the Hungarian and Bohemian peers their well-founded jealousy of the House of Hapsburg ; so that Ferdinand of Austria was elected to both crowns. Of the details we shall afterwards speak.

Nothing is commoner, than that public danger threatening from a foreign power induces nations to lend great military force into the hand of some king or general ; and nothing, alas ! is commoner, than perfidy in the Trustee of power. The same drama was acted on a greater scale in the history of the House of Austria.

III.—CASTILE.

CHARLES of Ghent, son of Philip and Joanna, was born in the year 1500 of our era. When only 16 years old, he usurped royal power in Spain ; while his mother,—queen in her own right,—was swallowed up in grief at his father's death. The usurpation was inwardly resented, but led to no public resistance.—In the third year afterwards, he was elected emperor of Germany, to the deepest dissatisfaction of leading Spaniards, who foreboded the evil results, yet dreaded a convulsive struggle, if they attempted to forbid such a union of crowns.

A statement of grievances had been already laid before him, and redress had been claimed. The principal cities of Castile now insisted on a reply to their demands, before he should quit the country. He had spent prematurely the first donative voted to him by the Cortes ; and as he was exceedingly in want of money, he was forced to summon them anew. But, in order to withdraw it from the watchful eye of the Castilian public, he

summoned the Cortes (or Parliament) contrary to all usage, in the remote Spanish province of Galicia ; and there, by whatever influences, to the amazement of the country, obtained a second “ free gift ” before the time was passed for paying the first, and without redressing a single grievance. Having got the money, he cared no more for his people ; but departed to receive the imperial crown, illegally leaving a *Fleming*, cardinal Adrian, as his viceroy in Spain.

The cities of Toledo and Segovia were irritated by these unconstitutional proceedings into acts of violence ; whereupon the Fleming at once proceeded against them in battle array, as if they had been foreign enemies. His troops reduced the town of Segovia to ashes ; upon which the public rage against him as a foreign usurper aroused the people everywhere into warlike resistance. A great convention of the Commons took place, and a general *Junta* or Association was organized. The young Emperor hereupon wrote letters of great gentleness and concession to the Commons, exhorting them to lay down their arms, and specially promising that in future no public office should be conferred upon any but native Castilians. But at the same time, he sent other letters to the nobles, exciting them to oppose the Commons ; and, unhappily for the nobles themselves, as well as for Spain, he succeeded in winning them over to his cause.

The grievances of which the Commons complained,—condensed by Robertson,—are remarkable, as showing how similar they have been in all Europe. After a long preamble concerning the various calamities under which the nation groaned, in consequence of the errors and corruption in government, they notice the exemplary patience with which the people had endured them, until at last duty forced them to provide in a legal manner for their own safety and that of the constitution : for this purpose they demanded, 1. that the King would, like all his predecessors, reside in Spain ; 2. that he would not marry without the consent of the Cortes ; 3. that if ever obliged to leave the kingdom, he would make no foreigner regent ; 4. that he should bring in no Flemings or other foreigners round his person ; 5. that no foreign troops should, on any pretence whatever, be introduced into the kingdom ; 6. that none but natives should be capable of holding any office or benefice in Church or State ; 7. that no foreigner should be naturalized by the King’s sole authority ; 8. that free quarters shall not be granted to soldiers or King’s servants, for more than six days, and that, only when the Court is in a progress ; 9. that all the taxes shall be

replaced as they were at the death of Queen Isabella ; 10. that all new offices since created by the mere authority of the Crown shall be abolished ; 11. that the subsidy granted by the late Cortes in Galicia shall not be exacted ; 12. that the Crown shall not interfere in elections ; 13. that no member of the Cortes shall receive office or pension from the King ; 14. *that the bribes given or promised at that Cortes shall be revoked* ; 15. that in all future Cortes each city shall send one representative of the clergy, one of the gentry, and one of the Commons, each to be elected by his own order ; 16. that each constituency shall pay a competent indemnification to its representative ; 17. that the Cortes shall assemble *once in three years at least*, whether summoned by the King or not, and shall then at once proceed to business ; 18. that judges shall have fixed salaries ; 19. that no grant of the goods of persons accused shall be valid, if given before sentence was pronounced against them ; 20. that gold, silver and jewels shall not be sent out of the kingdom ; 21. that the then Archbishop of Toledo, being a foreigner, shall be compelled to resign.

To all these demands it is probable that the nobles heartily acceded ; but the Commons, regarding the crisis important for confirming the public liberties, which manifestly had as yet been insufficiently defended, made other claims which the nobles were too selfish to endure. Generally, it was demanded that all privileges which the nobles had obtained to the prejudice of the Commons, should be revoked ; and in particular, 1. that the government of cities or towns be not put [by the act of the Crown] into the hands of noblemen ; 2. *that the possessions of the nobility be subject to all public taxes in the same manner as those of the commons* ; 3. that inquiry be made into the management of the Crown estates in past years ; and that if the King do not in 30 days appoint competent auditors, it shall be lawful for the Cortes to appoint them ; 4. that indulgence shall not be proclaimed in the kingdom without leave of the Cortes, and that the money thence arising shall be faithfully employed in the Turkish wars ; 5. *that prelates absent from their dioceses more than half the year shall forfeit their revenues during their absence* ; 6. that ecclesiastical judges shall not exact greater fees than those in the secular courts.

Finally it was demanded that the King should ratify all the proceedings of the Commons, as good constitutional service ; should pass an amnesty for any excesses into which the cities had been hurried by zeal ; should solemnly swear to the articles, *and never solicit pope or prelate to absolve him from his oath.*

It is of great interest to read these details, because they show how opposite to revolutionary were the principles of the Commons; how distinct and well specified are their demands, how free from highflown and dangerous generalizations.

Nevertheless, the deputies appointed to lay this Bill of Rights before the King, were warned that they could not do so without endangering their lives. Upon their return with this news, the excitement was great, and the Commons resolved to arm the whole country. But the nobles also armed their vassals, who were more accustomed to war. Dread of fratricidal conflict led to negotiations. The Commons hereupon fell into division: some were for concessions to the nobles, and the rest then began to doubt what was to be the prize of victory. Some of the cities were won over to the nobles, and in consequence only the more violent counsels prevailed among the rest. But the nobles with the royal party defeated the army of the Commons, and the popular cause was ruined. The consequences are thus told by the historian :*

“ The Cortes still continued to make a part of the Castilian Constitution, and was summoned to meet whenever the King stood in need of money; but instead of adhering to their ancient and cautious form of examining and redressing public grievances *before* they proceeded to grant any supply, the more courtly custom of voting a donative in the first place was introduced; and the Sovereign, having obtained all that he wanted, never allowed them to enter into any inquiry, or to attempt any reformation injurious to his authority. The privileges which the cities had enjoyed were gradually circumscribed or abolished; their commerce began from this period to decline; and becoming less wealthy and populous, they lost that power and influence which they had acquired in the Cortes.”

But the termination of these events was not till seventeen years later. In 1539 Charles held a Cortes at Toledo to demand a general excise on commodities, in order to discharge his enormous war-debts. But the Spaniards already felt themselves oppressed with a load of taxes unknown to their ancestors; and the nobles in particular inveighed against imposts which would fall upon *them*, and thus violate the distinguishing right of their Order. Alas! in their shortsightedness they had made the Emperor their master by fighting his battle against the just demands of the Commons. He now unceremoniously dispensed with the presence of the nobility at the Cortes; and summoned only the

* Robertson, book iii.; year 1522.

36 representatives of 18 cities. This assembly was too feeble to withstand any commands of the Emperor, and became thenceforward a mere screen of despotism. Charles, who had essentially subverted the constitution of the Cortes, tried to disguise the breach of his oath by this shadowy assembly. Thus were the public liberties of Castile destroyed by their King. Courtly disputants may talk about the “rights of conquest;” but such phraseology merely assimilates kings to robbers, and exhibits their cause as that of lawlessness and selfwill.

IV.—VALENCIA AND ARAGON.

No royalty in Europe was restricted by wiser laws or by popular liberties earlier developed than Aragon, to which Valencia and Catalonia had been united. *Popular* representation (says Hallam) was more ancient in Aragon, than in any European monarchy. The heir to the crown was not permitted to assume the name of king, or exercise any royal authority, until he had knelt to pronounce the coronation oath, administered to him by the Chief Justice. Royalty was not conceived of as an inherent superiority of blood, but as an official superiority guaranteed for mutual benefit under mutual responsibilities. This was strikingly denoted by the very words of the Oath of Allegiance which followed the Coronation Oath, and is almost rude and minatory in its very promise of loyalty. “We,” was the response of the Chief Justice to the King, in the name of all the barons,—“We, who are separately as good as you, and collectively more powerful than you, promise obedience to your government, if you maintain our rights and liberties; but if not, not.” A fundamental article provided for deposing the king, if unfaithful. The Chief Justice was irremovable by the king, and had (as the English Judges) full power to interpret law, and overrule illegal acts of the executive Government, especially in the matter of false imprisonment. After this it will readily be conceived, that the whole Aragonese system was as far as that of modern England from enduring the thought that the King was superior to the law. Nevertheless, in the kingdom of Valencia, which was united to that of Aragon, the power of the nobles over the commonalty appears to have been oppressive, and presently gave a handle to despotism. When young Charles of Ghent was about to receive the imperial crown of

Germany, he sent a proxy to hold the Cortes at Valencia, and request “a free gift” of them; but they replied that by the fundamental laws they were not allowed to acknowledge an absent king, nor to grant him any subsidy. Hereupon, Charles, instead of listening or inquiring into the law, seized the opportunity of an insurrection of the populace against the domination of the nobility, and *authorized the revolters to continue in arms*. His edict gave a vast impetus to the popular movement. The multitude expelled the nobles, elected their own magistrates, and formed an association of “*Brotherhood*,” which committed wild excesses.* It is striking to observe, at that early period the development in the House of Austria of this unprincipled tendency to foster anarchical violence, with a view to overturn the barriers of law. It is the old policy of false demagogues who are seeking to become tyrants; but, except in this House, it is rarely seen in the actual occupants of royalty.

The “*Brotherhood*” not only drove out the nobles from most of the cities, but proceeded to plunder their houses, waste their lands, and assault their castles. The nobles took up arms in self-defence, and two years of inveterate civil war (1520 & 1521) scourged the country. At last, when the royal party had succeeded against the Commons in Castile, Charles threw himself into the scale of the Valencian nobility, and with them crushed the deluded populace.

The kingdom of Valencia was so united to that of Aragon, that its constitution could not be avowedly invaded while that of Aragon stood. It was undermined greatly by this civil war, which the King first excited and then quelled; having punished the nobles and middle classes by means of the lower people, and finally made the former owe their deliverance to him. Yet it was reserved for his son Philip II. to finish the work thus begun.

Philip, as historians tell us, had been a party to the assassination of Escovedo, secretary to his half brother, Don John of Austria: whose death soon after was likewise thought suspicious. Antonio Perez, the secretary and confidant of Philip, who was supposed to know these and other shameful transactions, being persecuted by the King’s jealousy, escaped into his native Aragon; and when there arrested by the King’s orders, appealed to the law of the land. The Chief Justice, as was his duty, claimed for him a public trial before his own court; to evade which, the King had Perez accused of *heresy* by the In-

* Robertson, Charles V., book i.; year 1522.

quisition. But the Justice would not surrender him to that arbitrary tribunal. The Marquess of Almenara, the King's minister, broke open the prison by violence to seize him, and died by the rough usage which befel him, in the tumult which he had provoked.

Upon this Philip ordered a Castilian army to invade Aragon. By such an extravagant illegality, which in fact made him a public enemy, the Aragonese were roused to resistance. The Chief Justice called the people to arms, and the priests exhorted them in the same cause; but the nobility shamefully deserted the public liberties, and the royal general overbore the untrained levies of the Commons. Upon this Philip wrote to him with his own hand, and without the countersignature of any minister:—
“ As soon as you receive this, you are to proceed to imprison
“ and execute the Chief Justice, Don Juan de Lanuza; and let
“ me hear of his execution as soon as of his imprisonment.” The order was literally obeyed; and thenceforward the constitution of Aragon was an empty name. A pretence and form of it indeed remained under the House of Austria, and the formal abolition of the liberties of Aragon and Valencia was reserved for Philip V. in the eighteenth century, the first Bourbon king of Spain. But no one imagines that any real liberty or security for the dearest rights of man continued in Aragon after Philip's invasion of his kingdom with foreign forces. The shadow of a constitution which he left did but remind the nation of his perfidy.

V.—BOHEMIA.

FERDINAND, brother of the Emperor Charles, was freely chosen to fill the elective throne of Bohemia, and also of Hungary, in the year 1526. He had in the first instance imprudently *claimed* both Crowns, in virtue especially of the private family-compact with the late king Louis, his wife's brother and his sister's husband; but the Estates (or Parliament) of Bohemia, alarmed at such pretensions, scrupulously enforced every legal ceremony that might put beyond a doubt the freedom of their choice. A Coronation being always attended with pomp and display, the oath attached to it is liable to be treated by princes as a mere form. In the vain hope of inventing a *covenant purely personal*, the Bohemians, (as the Hungarians after them,) exacted, previous to coronation, the royal signature to a written Charter,

which Historians name a *Reversal*.* In this deed, the new King avowed that he had received the crown, not by any previous right, but by a gratuitous and voluntary election. In his letter of thanks to the Estates, he promised to observe the *Religious Compacts*, to raise no foreigners to any office of State, to govern the kingdom according to ancient laws and customs, and to reside at Prague.† He soon afterwards repaired to Iglau, took the solemn Coronation Oath, and proceeded forthwith to break his engagements.

His first great palpable breach of faith was in becoming an absentee from Bohemia for ten full years; which of itself made constitutional government by a foreigner and a new king almost impossible. After he had concluded a peace with the Turks and had nothing to fear from abroad, he not only committed the illegality of restoring the archiepiscopal see of Prague, hereby violating the Religious Compacts, but was daring enough formally to recant the Reversal, and claimed to be Hereditary sovereign, in virtue of his marriage, and of the family-compacts.‡ This of course produced the greatest indignation: but the Bohemians, though then as free as any nation in the world, knew not how to proceed against an impudence so startling. Royal perfidy cannot possibly be punished by anything short of deposition, and nations always suffer long and much, before they can agree to apply this remedy.

Ferdinand was emboldened by his impunity, and by his brother's successful annihilation of the liberties of Castile. That brother was now engaged in a similar project against the religious liberties of Germany, and asked aid from Ferdinand. The Diet of Bohemia, in 1546, granted to the King a large levy of troops to defend the country against the Turks or other public enemies; upon which, the King compelled them to invade the territories of the elector of Saxony, the dearest foreign friend of Bohemia. This was a direct breach of the constitution, which vested in the Estates the right to make war. He followed it up by an edict, ordering new levies of men at his own will, and declaring that all who disobeyed it "should, according to the laws of the land, be deprived of their honours, lives and property." The passive resistance of the nation forced him nevertheless to convene a Diet, from which by flatteries, by false pretences, and by rescinding his illegal edict, he gained partial concessions. But no sooner was this

* Robertson, Charles V., book iv. The Deed (says Coxe) is preserved in Goldastus de Privilegiis Bohemiæ, App. 206.

† Coxe, ch. 33.

‡ Coxe, ch. 34.

achieved, than he endeavoured again to send the Bohemian armies against Saxony, and bring his brother's armies into Bohemia ; and thereby at last forced his people to stand on their defence. The delegates then plainly told him, that the Estates had certain information of a design to overturn the constitution, destroy the kingdom, and extirpate the language of Bohemia.

In the midst of this armed neutrality came the startling news that the Emperor Charles had defeated and dethroned the Elector of Saxony, which removed the immediate matter of controversy, and caused in the popular league an incipient break-up. The Estates were alarmed, and passed a dutiful vote, that as the war was now concluded, and as they fully confided in his gracious promise not to introduce foreign troops into Bohemia, they were willing to dismiss their levies ; and on the next day they issued orders to their commander to this effect.

Only a short time before, Ferdinand had been at their mercy. He had violated his oaths, and had attempted to act tyrannically ; they had shown their power, but had not used it. This (it seems) is an unpardonable sin to a king. Ferdinand seized the moment (July 2nd, 1547) to bring his brother's armies into Prague,—itself an act of perjury. He established a reign of terror by executions, imprisonments, banishments, confiscations ; disarmed the people, and loaded them with arbitrary and exorbitant taxes ; remodelled at pleasure the political rights of all the Bohemian towns but three ; terrified the Diet by bloody executions beneath their eyes, before proceeding to business ; passed what laws he pleased : bade the public carnifex, between the blows dealt to his victims, to proclaim Ferdinand “ their Hereditary Lord ;” destroyed freedom of the press, brought in Jesuits, and gave over to them the public education.

Having thus by a tissue of perjury and murder changed Bohemia from an elective into a hereditary monarchy, “ *he restored tranquillity*, (says Archdeacon Coxe, the favouring historian whom we closely follow,) and suppressed the factions of a volatile and turbulent people ; yet he at the same time depressed that energy of mind and military ardour, which are inseparable from a free government and are fostered by civil contests, and checked that active commercial spirit which flourishes in the consciousness of independence. From this cause the towns, which had hitherto been remarkable for their commerce, wealth, and population, exhibited under his reign the first symptoms of decline ; and the Bohemians began to lose that military fame, which had rendered them the example and the terror of Europe.”

But this was only the beginning of sorrows to Bohemia. Their constitution was not yet formally destroyed ; it had only been remade at the pleasure of the King, and the fatal House of Austria been riveted round their necks. The Ferdinand who was guilty of these deeds, is praised by historians as an amiable man, exemplary in private life, and the best sovereign of this dynasty, except his son Maximilian II.

But Rudolf II., son of Maximilian, a pupil of the Jesuits, convulsed all his dominions by his fanatical efforts to extirpate Protestantism, with equal disregard to natural justice and mercy, as to the laws and his oaths. Bohemia had her full share of his atrocity, which ended in his deposition by his brother Matthias. One episode of Rudolf's Bohemian proceedings deserves to be here mentioned, from its striking similarity to the recent treacherous dealings of Austria with Jellachich.

Rudolf, when alarmed at the treason of his brother Matthias, suddenly became gracious towards the Bohemian Protestants, and courted the good-will of the Estates. They demanded and obtained full toleration,* and redress of numerous grievances, July 5th, 1609 ; but in the very next year he violated his engagements. A great insurrection of Bohemia followed ; and Henry IV. of France prepared to invade Germany, in favour of the Protestants. On May 14th, 1610, Henry fell opportunely by the stroke of an assassin, and the French war was stopped. Rudolf now, by means of his brother Leopold, sent in a general named *Ramée*, with 16,000 men, who desolated Upper Austria and Bohemia. It was impossible to conceal that this was a shameful plot of the Emperor's, and that his aim was, to annul the Religious Privileges, which he had of late so solemnly re-enacted with fresh sanctions. To withhold the Bohemians from immediate action, Rudolf, in the Diet at Prague, " called God to witness that the " irruption was without his knowledge or consent," recommended the adoption of vigorous measures against *Ramée*, and sent a herald commanding Leopold to withdraw his troops. Leopold affected innocence equal to that of his brother, and threw the blame on *Ramée*. A truce and a treaty was made. Leopold lulled the Bohemians into security, and then by aid of massacre took military possession of Prague during the festivities which celebrated the peace. Nevertheless he was repulsed and his crime useless. Rudolf found he could no longer cloak his

* To the Royal Edict a singular clause was annexed, by which Rudolf declared all future ordinances to be null, whether from him or his successors, which should attempt to change or abrogate the act of toleration.—*Coxe*, ch. 44.

treachery, and avowed himself the patron of Leopold and of Ramée. But the rage of the Bohemians was roused, universal levies took place, the Moravians joined them, Matthias had won over the Hungarians, and Rudolf was deposed.

Matthias was unable to justify his own usurpation, except by avowing that the right of transferring the crown was inherent in the Estates. Accordingly, on the 23rd of May, 1611, he was glad to be chosen king with all the forms of an elective monarchy, and confirmed all the old rights and privileges of the nation, civil and religious. Bohemia seemed for a moment to have recovered her inalienable liberties, even under the House of Hapsburg.

Nevertheless, it was no part of Matthias's intention to allow to the Bohemians either full religious freedom or the elective monarchy. When his health was sinking he introduced his nephew Ferdinand to the Estates at Prague, with the following words : “ As I and my brothers are without children, I deem it necessary for the advantage of Bohemia that my kinsman Ferdinand be proclaimed and crowned king : I therefore request you to fix a day for the confirmation of this appointment.” From a dread of civil war the Estates acceded, although Ferdinand was personally much feared by the Protestants ; but the pretence that the King was still allowing their right to elect, was pleaded to overcome scruples. In other affairs Matthias was a far better prince than either his predecessor or his successor ; but in forcing such a successor upon the Bohemians, he bequeathed to them misery and national ruin.

Ferdinand instantly broke his coronation oath by interfering with the Government in the lifetime of Matthias. His ministers were selected for their bigotry, and one of them plainly declared that executions and confiscations were necessary, “ to restore tranquillity,” and to overthrow the Royal Edict, which they maintained not to be binding, because it had been obtained by force. At the same time it became known that Ferdinand had made a secret treaty with Spain to transfer the crown ultimately to the Spanish branch of the family. This deed, at once illegal and traitorous, was in itself enough to justify his deposition in the court of conscience. The attempt of the Court to restrict the freedom of Protestant worship was resolutely resisted in its first steps, since warning so plain had been given, that the practical intolerance of the Crown would increase up to the full measure of the weakness of the people ; and the dreadful Thirty Years’ War began in 1618, in spite of Matthias’s endeavours to control the prince whom he had raised. Matthias had persecuted Lu-

therans and Calvinists in Bohemia, leaving only the older Protestants, the successors of Huss, unmolested; but he foresaw the horrors of the new war, which was already begun in earnest. He convoked the Estates at Vienna; but in reply to his request for succours and subsidies, he was met with demands for the redress of grievances, and with just reproaches for plunging into a war against Bohemia without their consent. He met with no better success even from the Catholics of the German Empire, who shuddered at the coming calamities, and strongly urged him to effect a reconciliation at all events. He resolved to do so; overruled his nephew Ferdinand, and summoned the insurgents to negotiation; but his broken strength failed under the exasperation endured from his nephew, and under the humiliation of the Crown. He expired before the pacification could be effected.

Ferdinand, now uncontrolled, took on himself unhesitatingly the entire responsibility and guilt of the war, which all parties so abhorred and deprecated. He made indeed an attempt to deceive the insurgents, by a letter, which solemnly promised that he would fulfil all the engagements which he had made at his coronation: but his acts at the same time disproved his words. They therefore refused the truce which he had asked in order to gain time, declared him to have forfeited the throne, and elected Frederick the elector Palatine, king of Bohemia. In the decisive step of deposing Ferdinand, the Estates of Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, and Lusatia combined. It was strictly a national and unanimous proceeding.

Unhappily for Bohemia, the new king, though amiable and esteemed, was not equal to his difficult position. He is reproached with having made alliance with the Sultan of Turkey, who was too distant to help him; and by this act he is said to have disgusted the German Protestants. It is rather to be feared that they wanted an excuse for not aiding him; for which selfishness they presently paid dearly. Ferdinand's experienced generals, with the aid of 20,000 Spaniards, defeated Frederick in the battle of the WHITE MOUNTAIN, near Prague, which decided the fate of Bohemia, and excited Ferdinand, now emperor of Germany, to still wider projects against German liberty.

Prague had no choice but to admit the Austro-Spanish armies, and obtained exemption from plunder, but no political compact. They were disarmed, and the Estates were forced to take an *unconditional* oath of allegiance. For three months no severity whatever followed. The principal insurgents were deceived by this apparent lenity, and came out from their hiding-places. When the dissimulation of Ferdinand had thus obtained its object, he

suddenly arrested 40 principal persons in the night (Jan. 21st, 1621) and executed 23 of them, confiscating their property also. The rest he banished or condemned to perpetual imprisonment. Proscription and confiscation was published against the chiefs who had fled the country; and, more monstrous still, an Edict commanded that all landholders who had taken any part in the late attempt to uphold the laws against tyrannical usurpation, should come forward and *accuse themselves*, under the threat of severest vengeance if any who declined were afterwards convicted. Many who had been too timid to join in the insurrection were believed to have been driven by the same timidity to a false self-accusation. Above 700 nobles and knights, having thus registered their own guilt, were at once expelled from their property by this king, whose avowed aim was the ruin and extirpation of Protestants.

After this, he might have had peace, with full power over Bohemia. But he could not be satisfied without vengeance on his rival Frederick, whom he resolved to ruin, though German liberty must perish with him. He lawlessly proscribed Frederick and his adherents by a bare imperial Edict: declared their territory forfeited and divided among Catholic princes, and the electoral rights of the Palatinate transferred to the Catholic duke of Bavaria. By such an assumption of despotic power, he ultimately forced the German Protestants into arms against him; and as he had aid from Spain, they too needed foreign alliances. Denmark was at first their chief support; and since for some years Ferdinand carried on the war to a disadvantage, he was forced to delay farther cruelties against Bohemia; but in 1628, when his able general Waldstein had retrieved his affairs in Germany, and Bethlem Gabor, the great Prince of Transylvania, made peace with him in Hungary, Ferdinand judged that the time was come to destroy for ever the religion, nationality and language of Bohemia.

We shall describe his proceedings in the very words of Archdeacon Coxe. He ejected all the preachers, schoolmasters and professors, and delivered up the churches to monks, whom he had collected indiscriminately from all quarters of Europe. He prohibited all who were not Catholics from exercising any trade or handicraft; laid the severest fines on all who preserved even in secret the slightest remnant of their former worship, declared Protestant marriages and baptisms null, and wills made by Protestants invalid. He even drove the poor, the sick, and the distressed from the almshouses and hospitals.

In the capital, the Protestant burghers were expelled with

their wives and families, and the poorer orders compelled to become Catholics. The other towns, and even the remotest villages, were visited by missionary deputations of Jesuits and Capuchin friars, accompanied by a military force. Houses were pillaged, men imprisoned, women and children exposed to all the outrages of the soldiery. Some were massacred without mercy, some hunted to the woods and mountains, some dragged to processions and masses with every species of insult and cruelty: and any who resisted were racked, mutilated and put to death with tortures too shocking to describe.

In the midst of these horrors Ferdinand repaired to Prague to publish his clemency. He declared that he confirmed to the Estates their power of taxation and other civil privileges; but he abolished their right to elect a king, and nominated and crowned his own son as his successor. He forbade the use of the Bohemian tongue in any public transaction, and formally abrogated the Royal Edict of Toleration, by swearing to which he had attained the Crown himself. He restored the order of the Catholic clergy to its Middle-Age dignity, avowed that he would not tolerate a Protestant in the land, and formally banished all who did not in a specified time avow their adherence to the Catholic Church. By this act he drove out of the kingdom 30,000 families, with all their servants and retainers, including the most learned, the richest, and most industrious portion of the community; and thus inflicted on Bohemia a wound, from which (says Coxe) the country has never recovered.

Though Coxe is as favourable to the House of Austria, as it is possible for an Englishman, a Protestant Archdeacon, and a man of humanity to be, exaggeration of these horrors will always be suspected in a Protestant writer. Coxe, therefore, has thought fit to fortify himself by the following ample summary from a *Catholic historian*, a subject of the House of Austria.

"The records of history scarcely furnish an example of such a change as Bohemia underwent during the reign of Ferdinand II. In 1620, except only the monks and a few of the nobility, the whole country was entirely Protestant: at the death of Ferdinand it was, in appearance at least, Catholic. Till the battle of the White Mountain the Estates enjoyed more exclusive privileges than the Parliament of England. They enacted laws, imposed taxes, contracted alliances, declared war and peace, and chose or confirmed their kings; but all these they now lost. Previous to that period the Bohemians were considered

as a warlike nation. The annals of history recorded : ‘ The Bohemians took the field ; the Bohemians stormed the fortifications ; the Bohemians gained the victory :’ but they are now blended with other peoples and are no longer distinguished as a nation. Till this fatal period the Bohemians were daring, undaunted, enterprizing, emulous of fame : now they have lost all their courage, their national pride, their enterprizing spirit. They fled before the Swedes like sheep, or suffered themselves to be trampled under foot. The German language was used by the monks in their sermons, and became general among nobles and citizens, who grew ashamed of their native speech, as the tongue of villagers and peasants. The arts and sciences sank beyond recovery. During the period which immediately followed the banishment of the Protestants, Bohemia scarcely produced one man eminent in any branch of learning. The Caroline University was under the direction of the Jesuits, or suppressed : by order of the Pope all promotions were stopped, and no academical honours conferred. A few patriots, both among the clergy and laity, murmured openly, though ineffectually. The greater part of the schools were conducted by Jesuits and other monkish orders, who taught nothing but bad Latin. It cannot be denied, that several of the Jesuits were men of great learning and science, but their system was, to keep the people in ignorance. Agreeably to this principle, they gave their scholars the rind only, and kept to themselves the pulp of literature. They travelled from town to town and house to house, examining all the books ; which every householder was forced to produce. The greater part they confiscated and burnt ; so that a Bohemian book and a rare book are synonymous terms. They thus endeavoured to extinguish the ancient literature of the country, laboured to persuade the students, that, before the introduction of their Order into Bohemia, nothing but ignorance prevailed, and carefully concealed the learned labours, and even the names, of our ancestors. Such was their despotism, that only after the extinction of their Order was it possible to publish the collections and writings of the patriotic Balbinus on the literature of the ancient Bohemians. In a word, from this period the history of Bohemia ceases, and the history of every other nation in Bohemia begins.’

Such is the reward that Bohemia reaped from electing monarchs of the House of Hapsburg.

VI.—PROTESTANT GERMANY.

THE complicated system of the German Empire makes it hard to exhibit briefly the legal aspect of the contests between the Emperors of the House of Hapsburg, and the upholders of Constitutional liberty. In this subject, therefore, the general moral view takes the lead of the purely constitutional question.

It must however be understood, that the German Princes were sovereign in their own States, and, in the days of the Emperor Charles V. (Charles of Ghent), had but recently renounced the right of separate war and peace. The Emperor, who was elected by seven of them, represented Germany to the foreigner; and, like the President of the United States, held a most important and honourable office: but his functions were as jealously limited. Nor only so: but the Diet also was rather to be compared to the American Congress than to an English Parliament: for its control was by no means unlimited over the separate States, which had complete internal jurisdiction.

Until 1486 every State made peace and war at pleasure, and war of State against State was legal. In that year a ten years' peace was proclaimed; and in 1495 they all agreed, in a Diet at Worms, for ever to abolish separate war. It was not till 1512 that the central organization was completed, which united all Germany. The States however had only effected *union*, by a definite treaty: they had not submitted to subjection, renounced sovereignty, nor thrown down their internal liberties to be trampled on by a majority of the Diet.

The doctrines of Luther spread rapidly from 1517 to 1521, in which year the young Emperor Charles,—who on his accession greatly needed the support of the Pope,—prevailed on a Diet at Worms to sanction a decree which he issued against Luther: but the Elector of Saxony refused to execute it. A few years after, the Emperor fell into a violent quarrel with the Pope; and in 1526 gave a great impulse to the Reformation, by publishing a manifesto which taxed him with ingratitude, ambition, and deceit, and threatened to appeal from him to a general Council. Nor did he confine himself to words. His generals took Rome by storm, held possession of it for months, and inflicted upon the innocent Romans everything that avarice, cruelty, and brutal lust can perpetrate. They besieged the Pope in the Castle of St. Angelo, and at length forced him to surrender. Charles hypocritically went into mourning at the event, and ordered public prayers and processions in Spain for the re-

covery of the Pope's liberty, which, by an order to his generals, he could have immediately granted.

In a Diet of the Empire held at Spires, June 25th, 1526, an Act was passed which was regarded equivalent to a recognition of Protestantism. The doctrines of Luther had affected princes as well as their subjects, and were embraced zealously in many of the free cities. About one half of the Germanic body had declared itself free from the Papal See, and while Charles was at war with Rome, he was well pleased at this circumstance. But when his Castilian Parliament positively refused him more money, and he could not maintain his armies, he condescended to accept a ransom of the Pope; and in 1529 entered into close alliance with him. After this, he perceived that by becoming the champion of the Papacy he would have its influence to aid him in usurping power in Germany, where it was manifest that Catholicism would soon die out, if not saved by royal violences.—Having summoned another Diet at Spires, he demanded of it by his commissioners to prohibit all farther religious reform, and to authorize his decree against Luther. Five Princes and fourteen free Cities solemnly *protested* against this decree, as unjust and impious. Hence their name Protestants.

Charles made another attempt in the Diet at Augsburg to induce the Reformers to surrender their convictions peaceably; but when that proved impossible, he prevailed on a majority of the Diet to issue a Decree condemning Protestantism, forbidding toleration of its teachers, enacting severe penalties against it, and *commanding all orders of men to assist with their persons and fortunes in executing this decree.* Such as refused to obey it were declared incapable of acting as judges, or *of appearing as parties in the Imperial Chamber*, the supreme Court of Judicature in the Empire.

In this decree, stimulated by Emperor and Pope, the Diet usurped the right of deposing and outlawing sovereign princes and free cities, if they did not fulfil its persecuting edicts. The Protestant States, who knew that this Emperor had but a few years back overthrown the liberties of his Castilian subjects, saw at once that he would not hesitate to bring in foreign troops against them: they therefore formed in 1530 the League of Smalkald, for mutual defence against all aggressors.

When prosecutions began in the Imperial Chamber against some of them on religious grounds, the League sent ambassadors into France and England. Charles did not dare as yet to encounter civil war in Germany, but he was safe, as knowing that the league *would only stand on the defence.* However, in

1535 it received more members. It then contained the Princes of Saxony, Brunswick, Hesse, Wirtemberg, Pomerania, Anhalt, Mansfield and Nassau : also twenty-four free cities, which ranked as princes : and the league was renewed for ten years.

The Emperor justly deprecated the division and weakening of Germany which such a state of things occasioned. That it was in his power to terminate it by abandoning the effort to enforce uniformity in religion, did not occur to him ; because the only sort of unity or of strength which he desired, was that of subjection to his absolute will. In 1540 the celebrated Council of Trent uttered sentences of condemnation against Protestants ; the Pope excommunicated and deposed the Archbishop of Cologne, an independent prince, and one of the Electors to the empire ; and it soon was manifested beyond question, that it was the intention of the Emperor to carry out this sentence and crush the League of Smalkald. The Protestants with amazing celerity raised a great and well-appointed army, of 70,000 foot, 15,000 horse, 120 cannon, 800 ammunition waggons, 8000 beasts of burden, and 6000 pioneers : and this came from but a part of their number. Charles was aghast, having no force to meet them ; but they were too defensive and too moderate to succeed ; and he instantly understood his advantage. To a temperate and candid manifesto from them, Charles replied by declaring them rebels and outlaws, confiscating their goods, absolving their subjects from allegiance, and making it meritorious to invade their territories.

These circumstances show, on which side the moral right lay. On *legal* questions, such as :—what were the limits of the Diet's authority,—good men may possibly have differed. But no candid person can question, that the Protestants were acting from conscience, and in the cause of reasonable freedom, while Charles was actuated only by personal ambition. The Emperor moreover violated the laws and his solemn oaths, by calling in Papal troops, Spaniards, Flemings, Bohemians, and Hungarians.—The confederates suffered disadvantage from divided authority ; and the treacherous Maurice of Saxony, for the bribe of his father-in-law's electoral dignities, stipulated to aid the Emperor. The insurgents suffered the usual penalty of moderation in those who are forced to oppose a tyrannical prince. Having been unwilling to strike while they were strong, they gave time for his intrigues, and fell unconditionally into his power. The dissolution of the League of Smalkald, and the dethronement, next year, of the Princes of Saxony and Hesse, were fatal blows to the liberty of all Germany. But as Charles

was no bigot, and, however haughty and unfeeling, too politic to be needlessly cruel, his usurpation and perjury appear small in comparison to the atrocities of the princes who were reared under Jesuit tuition.

Nevertheless, the presumption and haughtiness which his successes developed in him, disgusted and terrified his own supporters. In consequence, Maurice of Saxony was able to extort from him the treaty of Passau, in 1552; which to a certain extent regained the Protestant liberties; and gave rise to the Religious Peace, settled by the Diet of 1555. We may here mention, that it secured for all Princes and States of the Empire the right to tolerate or prohibit *either* religion within their own territories: and in so far, each State was independent of the Diet and of the Emperor.

Ferdinand I. and Maximilian II. were very tolerant in religious matters, on which the whole history of Germany turned. But Rudolf, a nurseling of the Jesuits, violated the Religious Peace, and convulsed all his dominions, as was above said. He suppressed Protestantism in the hereditary provinces of Austria, and thenceforward his House, except in one generation, has been the great enemy of religious freedom.

Not to be tedious, it may here suffice to remark, that the religious liberties of Germany were saved from the House of Hapsburg only at the cost of the calamitous Thirty Years' War, and with the aid of Denmark, Sweden and France. To estimate the slaughterers of this war, is difficult:—it has been said, that in whole provinces, two thirds of the population were exterminated. Much less is it possible to value the demoralization which it inflicted; its destruction of national feelings and character, and its damage to all intellectual interests. It was the gift of the House of Hapsburg to Germany. Some of the horrible details of cruelty towards women and children which are reported in this war, move a reader's incredulity: but concerning the hideous atrocities perpetrated at the sack of Magdeburg by the Imperial armies, with the express sanction of the Imperial general Tilly, whose conduct was approved by the Court,—there is no possibility of doubting.

In the peace of Westphalia, which terminated the war, A. D. 1648, it was stipulated, among other things, that the Diet should not decide by a majority, but by amicable accommodation; 1. in all causes of religion; 2. in all affairs in which Germany could not be considered as single and indivisible; 3. in all affairs in which Protestants and Catholics voted collectively on opposite sides.—This indicates that the Diet had been made the tool and

screen of the Emperor's usurpations: and constitutionally, it distinguishes this struggle from the others in which the House of Hapsburg has engaged.—Moreover, the Sovereignty of the States was acknowledged, as well as their right to form alliances among themselves and with foreign States, provided that none were concluded against the Emperor or the Empire. All the sovereigns were put under an obligation, not to persecute their subjects who professed a religion different from their own: except that Ferdinand III. indignantly rejected this stipulation for Austria.—Finally, through the persecuting tendencies of this House, Germany has been hindered from coalescing into a single political community: in struggling for that first great necessary of life,—Religious Freedom,—she has been forced to insist on upholding to an undesirable extent the independence of her small sovereignties. Everywhere the House of Hapsburg has done its utmost to secure, that men shall have no alternative between disorganization and its absolutism, between atheism and popery.

VII.—HEREDITARY STATES OF AUSTRIA.

IT is rather an intricate history to trace the annihilation of the liberties of Austria; and after all that we have written on Germany, it is less important to follow out details. Abundantly evident is it, that Austria *once*, like Spain, Bohemia, and Hungary, had its free institutions, and that these have been long destroyed by the uniform treachery of the dynasty.

It was mentioned that in the opening of the Thirty Years' War the Estates at Vienna positively refused supplies to the Emperor Matthias, and reproached him for plunging into a war with Bohemia without their consent. At that time we see that they retained the full power of an English House of Commons. Ferdinand II., a few years after, abolished by force the Protestant worship in his hereditary dominions, with his usual severity. We do not know whether this would have been sanctioned by the Estates, but it appears that he refused to summon them. During the Thirty Years' War, even the German Diet seems to have been suspended, until near to the close,* except that which was assembled to elect Ferdinand III. to the Empire. We have

* Coxe, ch. 57, *in fine*.

stated that this sovereign, at the peace of Westphalia, inflexibly refused to tolerate Protestantism in his dominions. He succeeded in farther breaking down the power and spirit of the Viennese Estates. In the next generation, the Estates had become accustomed to identify Catholicism with their own interests, and with their sovereign. There was no opposition, "they were tranquil and loyal, and granted subsidies," says Coxe, "with cheerfulness and alacrity." The dangerous invasion of the Turks also insured the ardent unanimity of all Austria.

The authority of the Estates of Austria could in no case have been maintained against the Crown, when it was manifest that their resistance to the will of the sovereign would simply have led to their violent extinction by his foreign forces. Hence in Vienna, as formerly in Castile and Aragon, the Parliament became nothing but a shadow and a blind for the despotism. This state of things continued until a recent period. It was in 1845-7, that a learned writer, Doblhoff, ventured to call public attention to the ancient rights of the Parliament; and in 1847 the same man was employed, as Minister of the Crown, to aid in reorganizing the constitutional liberties. This was but a perfidious temporizing on the part of the dynasty. A court cabal, headed by the Archduchess Sophia, mother of the present Emperor, plotted, from the day on which the new constitution was conceded, to overthrow it by treachery and by force of arms. This was done in October of the same year, by means of Windischgrätz and Jellachich. Vienna was bombarded and taken by storm, men were shot in heaps, every vestige of freedom was annihilated anew, and pure military violence enthroned. For more than a year Vienna was kept under martial law; and the rule of lawless force still continues in the very capital of the Austrian monarchy.

VIII.—NETHERLANDS.

WE have stated how, by the marriage of Maximilian to Mary of Burgundy, the House of Austria gained a claim to her father's realms. Maximilian obtained actual possession of the Netherlands and of Franche Comté: but the rest of Mary's dominions were seized and kept by the rapacious Louis XI. of France. Maximilian was never able to recover Burgundy, but Artois was at length ceded to him by Charles VIII., son of Louis.

The Low Countries, from the earliest times, were distinguished

by a free spirit. The local privileges of the towns, which had been reserved by the burghers in submitting to the dukes of Burgundy, were remarkably great. Maximilian, by violating them *immediately on his wife's death*, raised up a civil war, in which he was made prisoner: and in spite of the interference of the Pope and of the German powers—(for he was then “King of the Romans,” or heir apparent to the Empire)—he was forced to concede everything to his subjects, both privileges and amnesty. Maximilian was not a dark and malignant man; but he learned from his contemporary, Louis XI. of France, to steal in like a fox, and devour like a tiger; a lesson which his posterity have faithfully retained.

Having called in the Emperor, with 40,000 men, he endeavoured to break loose from his recent solemn engagements, and establish a rule of force: but the valour of the Flemings and the military talents of Philip of Cleves thwarted him, and he was forced to a new compromise. Flanders paid him a subsidy, but held fast her political rights.

When Maximilian succeeded to the Empire, his minor son, the handsome Philip, was left in the Netherlands as the nominal ruler; and since he was popular, kind, and too young to interfere, the States prospered much under his inactivity. He lived to have children, but died prematurely; his sister Margaret was named regent, and proved vigorous and sensible. The misfortunes of the people date from the era, when young Charles of Ghent, now emperor, proscribed “heretics” in the Low Countries, and violated the law by appointing functionaries for the express purpose of their pursuit and punishment. Thus did the House of Hapsburg, here, as everywhere else, begin, by its lawlessness, an atrocious contest.

During the war of 1539, in which Charles had involved all his dominions against France, the people of Ghent, suspecting misappropriation of the funds which they had furnished for the campaign, offered to march themselves against the enemy, instead of paying a further subsidy. When this was abruptly rejected by the Government, the people regarded it as a mark that it claimed to tax them at its pleasure, and riotous or seditious protests followed. But so little idea of revolt was there in this, that when Charles came in person to Ghent, he was at once admitted. In fact, Ghent being his native town, he was personally very popular there.—He forthwith arbitrarily beheaded 27 persons as traitors, withdrew the principal privileges of the city at his own will, and built a citadel to hold it in check for the future. In Ghent no one dared to murmur; but elsewhere

deep feeling showed itself, when the king, the sworn guardian of law, put men to death without trial, and perjuriously destroyed the permanent institutions of the country.

Towards the end of his life, Charles redoubled his severities against the Protestants in the Netherlands, and introduced a modified form of the Inquisition; thus laying the foundation for the horrors of his son's reign.

The freedom of the Netherlands had led to extraordinary industry, wealth, commerce, intelligence, and Protestantism. Literature, poetry, and art were also highly advanced, when in 1555 Philip II. succeeded his father. Philip had been born and bred in Spain, trained in Romish and despotic principles: he had only once visited the Low Countries, and was then disgusted by their cordial manliness. He at first concealed his designs, and induced the Estates to vote subsidies to him, some of which were to be paid by instalments through nine years. But in four years' time, his deeply-laid plans for overthrowing public liberty being discerned, the Estates replied to a new demand of his, by petitioning that he would "diminish the taxes, *withdraw his foreign troops, and entrust no official employments to foreigners.*" But the execution of heretics went on, and the country was roused to indignation. The Spanish soldiers, whom Philip had promised to withdraw in three months, were not withdrawn for two years, and had meanwhile ravaged a part of Zealand with open hostility.

In 1561, Philip and the Pope, without consulting the Estates or Towns, took on them to reorganize the free Belgian Church, appointing 18 nominees of the King for Bishops, instead of four ecclesiastically elected; with other arbitrary enactments which aimed to put the whole wealth of the abbeys at the disposal of the King. He would not assemble the Estates, and the people had no organs of resistance. The new bishops instantly assumed power, and began a terrible persecution of heresy.

In 1564, Philip abated his violence for some months, and in appearance sacrificed an unpopular minister,—the foreigner, Cardinal Granville,—probably in the hope of lulling vigilance and damping enthusiasm: for in the same year he suddenly sent out the fiercest edicts against heresy, and ordered the decree of the Council of Trent to be published through the 17 Provinces. Even the new bishops were disgusted with such an invasion of *their* constitutional rights; and Philip proceeded to establish the Inquisition, with orders to burn alive, bury alive, and destroy *secretly*. This dreadful tribunal, against all law,

and without any pretence of law, was brought into vigorous action in the beginning of 1566. Frightful insurrections followed, consisting frequently of a street-war of the most desperate kind, against these secret kidnappers and murderers.

On the 10th of February the nobility rose, and an avowed public resistance commenced, but *a change of dynasty was not yet thought of*. Bands of peasants and low persons, excited to frenzy by the Inquisition, betook themselves to image-breaking, and other bloodless excesses. Four hundred churches were pillaged in a very short time; and though the Prince of Orange and Count Egmont and other patriot-lords made some terrible examples of summary vengeance on such robbers, Philip now fancied that he had a moral justification for any sort or amount of vengeance, and began that dreadful war which raged without cessation for 40 years.

Valenciennes was first besieged by the royal troops, and captured after 36 hours' bombardment. The confederacy was dissolved by dissensions, and royal despotism momentarily victorious. Swarms of refugees were driven into Germany and England, and the celebrated Duke of Alva in the summer of 1567 entered the Low Countries with a veteran Spanish army, bent on rooting out heresy by military executions. Counts Egmont and Horn, who had refused to become revolutionists and foolishly imagined that their loyalty made them safe, were arrested, and in the next year were publicly beheaded.

Alva had established a special tribunal of 12 members, called by him, the Council of Troubles, and by the people the Council of Blood. Without regard to form or law, rank, sex or age, it condemned and punished at pleasure. Hanging, beheading, quartering, burning, were every-day spectacles. Confiscations only increased the avarice of Alva and his satellites. With capricious despotism, he forbade marriage, as well as emigration, without his special leave. All emigrant lords were summoned, and their property confiscated for non-appearance. At length, when, by the departure of Philip's sister the Duchess of Parma, Alva was left uncontrolled, the people were driven by frenzy to become banditti and pirates, till the land was desolated with carnage and ruin. Alva himself boasted that his executioners had put to death 18,000 Netherlanders.

It is not possible here to detail, how William of Nassau, prince of Orange, from small beginnings, rallied his unhappy countrymen. The struggle became horrible. The Netherlanders were not united, or their success would have been earlier. The Catholics were roused chiefly by Alva's illegal taxation, but were

often thrown back on to the side of Spain by dread of the intense Protestantism which his cruelties had evoked. When Haerlem had revolted, the Spaniards lost 10,000 men in the siege, and seven months of time; and on capturing it by famine, butchered or drowned 2000 men of the garrison. Reprisals naturally followed. Resistance became more stubborn than ever, and at last, in 1573, Philip recalled Alva, proclaimed *an amnesty*, and expected submission.

It was too late. To trust him was impossible, and two more years of horror followed; but when in 1575 the mild and tolerant Emperor Maximilian II. attempted mediation with his cousin, Philip's deputies, after gaining three months time by pretended deliberations, refused any toleration for Protestants, and the war recommenced with implacable violence. The royal troops openly revolted. On the 3rd of November, 1576, Antwerp was sacked and burnt by Spanish mutineers. For three days, carnage and pillage went on. More than 500 private mansions were burnt; 7000 citizens perished by sword, water, or fire. The Government at last, ashamed and horrified at the danger to which it was itself exposed from its own troops, proscribed the mutineers and called on all loyal subjects to aid in destroying them. It summoned the States General; which (the viceroy having died suddenly) assumed command in the name of the King, and the *PACIFICATION OF GHENT* followed, by which Liberty and the Constitution appeared to be regained. One of the articles of this treaty was, the *expulsion of all Spanish soldiers and other foreigners*.

Philip's new representative, Don John of Austria, affected at first the greatest moderation, and confirmed the pacification; but instantly proceeded to undermine it by treachery. His unconstitutional claims first gave alarm; next, his letters to Philip, intercepted and published by the King of France, made notorious the usual perfidy of the House of Hapsburg. In consequence, the civil war revived in 1578, with new carnage. Even the Emperor Rudolf II. and the Pope were horrified, and offered mediation; but as Philip obstinately refused toleration of heretics, reconciliation was impossible. The Prince of Orange had already formed on Jan. 29th, 1579, the famous *Union of Utrecht*, in which five Protestant Princes cemented themselves indissolubly; but without alluding to Philip. But the next year, on Sept. 29th, after Philip's final refusal of toleration, the Estates of the United Provinces renounced the sovereignty of Spain, and virtually commenced the *DUTCH REPUBLIC*.

Philip's revenge, was, to issue a ban against the Prince of

Orange, in which he “proscribes him as a public pest,” and promises to whoever will deliver him up, *dead or alive*, “in lands or money, at his choice,—the sum of 25,000 golden crowns;—to grant a free pardon to such person *for all former offences of what kind soever*;—and to invest him with letters patent of NOBILITY.” This was published on the 15th June.

He had calculated rightly. A first assassin sent a pistol bullet through the Prince’s face from side to side, and was instantly killed by the guards. The papers found on him, and evidence there elicited, proved that he held a bond from Philip for 28,000 ducats and other advantages, in case of his crime being successful. But the Prince recovered. A second assassin, in 1584, sent three balls into his body, and killed him almost on the spot. This man was a fanatical Catholic. By his own avowal he had received, not absolution only, but encouragement from ministers of his church, and an original letter is extant from the Prince of Parma to Philip, in which the Prince declares himself an accomplice in the deed. Philip was suspected by his contemporaries to have afterwards poisoned this very Prince of Parma, as previously his brother Don John of Austria. Such tales can seldom be tested; but their currency is a dreadful proof of the morality then known to exist in the Imperial Court.—The children of William’s assassin received the money and rewards which Philip had promised.

The crime of political assassination is common to all despotic oligarchies, whether called monarchical or aristocratic; but in modern European History, no dynasty is more stained with it than the Austrian. No sooner did Austria obtain her first footing in Hungary, than the Court assassinated, first the Italian *Gritti*, and next the Hungarian Cardinal Martinuzzi; although to the latter, Ferdinand I. was indebted for the sovereignty of Eastern Hungary and for the celebrated crown of St. Stephen. The Cardinal’s ear, remarkable for a tuft of hair, was sent to Ferdinand by the assassin, in proof of his fidelity.—The second Ferdinand in like manner, having twice owed his safety and crown in the Thirty Years’ War to the talents of his general Waldstein, was so irritated at that great man’s advocating (on purely political grounds) some humanity towards Protestants, that he suspected him of treason, dishonoured him, and when the effects of this on the army were feared, assassinated him. The Court published a manifesto, justifying the deed, and executed many other persons, in pretence that a great conspiracy was to be quelled. Down even to recent times there is too full ground to

believe that this atrocious mode of proceeding has been pursued, against no less signal a victim than the Archduke Alexander, palatine of Hungary. This prince was blown up in his summer-house by fireworks, in 1795 ; being at that time notoriously under the displeasure of his brother, the young Emperor Francis, because of his avowed determination to respect the Hungarian Constitution, to which he had made oath.

On the deposition of Philip, the Duke of Anjou was elected *Protector* of the Netherlands and duke of Brabant, Lothier, Limbourg, and Guelders. He consented to recognize William as sovereign in Holland and Zealand, and as lord of Friesland, though under homage to the Duke of Anjou. But the new protector was presently discontented with his limited powers, and conspired with his French officers against the liberty of the Flemings. He attempted to seize the principal towns by a coup-de-main, but succeeded only at Dunkirk and Termonde. He assaulted Antwerp in person, and was repulsed with disgraceful loss. So terminated his career in the Netherlands, before the murder of the Prince of Orange, whose career was cut short before he could sign the Capitulation by which the Estates would have recognized him as their independent sovereign.

The Prince of Parma renewed the war in the name of Philip, and within a year had reconquered what we now call *Belgium*. The depopulation of the country was fearful. Hundreds of villages had been abandoned to the wolves. Packs of dogs, run wild, hunted down brutes and men. Fields, woods, roads, were frequently undistinguishable ; for trees, weeds, and grass were mingled confusedly.

On the other hand, *Holland* gathered up all its energies, and prepared anew for war : nevertheless Antwerp was taken after a siege of 14 months. The Dutch got succour from our Elizabeth, which did them little direct service ; although, by diverting Philip's anger against England and engaging him to send the celebrated Armada to invade us, it exhausted the energies of Spain. Immediately after, Philip implicated himself in the civil war of France, to keep down the "twice-lapsed heretic" Henry of Navarre. Meanwhile, Prince Maurice of Orange made full use of the time thus gained. The English fleets pressed hard upon Spain. Philip was declining in years, health, and spirits, and Holland at last recovered itself. It has since remained independent : but the Spaniards continued their warlike efforts with great obstinacy, bloodshed, and desolation, after the death of Philip, until 1607 ; when, after two years'

negotiation, a *truce* for 12 years was arranged on the 9th of April, 1609, under the guarantee of France and England.

So at last ended the hostilities of the House of Austria against their own people in the Netherlands, who escaped the usual slavery which that House inflicts, only by so powerful a diversion as that of England and France.

IX.—BELGIUM.

THE result of the Forty Years' War was to separate the history of Belgium from that of Holland. Philip, a little before his death, gave his daughter Isabella in marriage to the Archduke Albert, brother of the Emperor Rudolf, and with her as dowry the kingdom of the Netherlands. Albert got and kept the southern provinces, but could not reconquer the Dutch Republic. Thus Belgium remained under the House of Austria. It reverted to the Spanish branch by the death of Isabella without children, and remained as the *Spanish* Netherlands until the peace of Utrecht, in 1713, when, the Bourbon dynasty having fixed itself in Spain, Belgium was recognized as properly Austrian. In this interval Belgium had suffered far less by wars than Holland, and its governors had learned by the proximity of Holland the danger of drawing the reins too tight. The Empress Maria Theresa was also very popular in Belgium; but her son the Emperor Joseph, of Hapsburg-Lorraine, aiming at beneficial results by lawless means, tried to rule despotically by Edicts, and roused at once the bigotry and the free spirit of the Belgians. Insurrection followed, and in 1790 seven revolted provinces declared the House of Austria to have forfeited its sovereignty, and assumed the title of the United Belgian States.

Belgium on this occasion had acted with a precipitation and excitement beyond all previous precedent; nor do we for a moment compare the grievances inflicted on them by Joseph II. to that which Holland, Bohemia, Castile, Aragon, Germany, Hungary, had endured from sovereigns of this House without actually disowning its sway. But it is certainly remarkable to see the despotic tendency so inveterate in this family, that Joseph, a man of genius and of excellent intentions, stirred up civil war in both Belgium and Hungary by his violent mode of proceeding.

X.—PROTESTANTS AND MOORS OF SPAIN.

THE account already given of Philip II.'s behaviour to Protestants in the Netherlands, will enable the reader to infer how he was likely to deal in Spain, and we may speak of that more briefly. Philip's return to his native land, in 1559, was celebrated by a vast number of *Acts of Faith*, as the surrender of heretics to be burnt by the Inquisition was named. On a single day, it was believed, from two to three thousand persons in all parts of Spain were simultaneously arrested, and disappeared for ever; it being generally uncertain whether they were killed or in prison. The nature of the despotism makes it impossible to get authentic details; but the archives of the "Holy Office," which have been brought to light in this century, furnish the following result:—

The total amount of persons executed by the Inquisition in Spain alone, during the three centuries of its existence there, is 32,000 persons burnt, and 291,000 condemned to perpetual imprisonment, the galleys, or other penalties.

But we pass from Protestants to Moors. Philip first disarmed the Moors, as a precaution. He next forbade them to speak the Moorish language, or continue anything of a Mohammedan exterior: especially their women were ordered to show their faces in public unveiled. The Moors, chiefly of Granada, betook themselves to petitions, remonstrances, and protestations of loyalty; but Philip was obstinate, and drove them into rebellion. Don John of Austria at length subdued the revolt; upon which Philip sold the prisoners for slaves, and dispersed the rest of the Moors into the old provinces of Spain. None remained congregated or in their original seats, but the Moors of Valencia, who had not joined in the insurrection, and who were protected by the nobles of Valencia, as valuable vassals.

But they were not to remain unmolested. In the next century Philip III. listened to the Archbishop of Valencia, who complained that the skill, industry, and frugality of the Valencian Moors enabled them to live and thrive and monopolize commerce and wealth; as a remedy for which, he advised to sell into foreign slavery all who were above seven years of age, and educate the children as real Christians. The landlords of Valencia warmly defended their vassals, but the determination of the Court was fixed; and no sooner was the truce with Holland signed, in 1609, than preparations were made for expelling the whole body. In vain did the Valencian nobles implore and

protest ; the fatal edict came forth. Only six families in every hundred were allowed to be *temporarily* retained by such nobles, in order to instruct their Christian successors how to manage drains, aqueducts, rice grounds, sugarworks, and other businesses ; and besides these, children under four years of age might remain. But the Moors in indignation refused to leave their children or to instruct the Christians in their arts.

The first band of exiles, about 20,000, reached Africa safely, and were kindly received ; but various calamities fell on the rest. Many were shipwrecked, many robbed and murdered by their crews, many were slain when landed on the Barbary coast. It is computed that 100,000 perished in some of these modes. In Spain about 30,000 had escaped to the mountains. War was made on these, and they were quickly subdued. Three thousand were forthwith put to death, the children under seven years of age were given as prize money for the soldiers to sell, and the rest were transported to Africa. All these horrors were perpetrated on dutiful, valuable subjects, who were not even pretended to have committed any crime, who *professed the Catholic religion at the order of the Court*,—and whose sole offences were, that they were of a different race, and were particularly industrious and intelligent.

But this was not all. The transportation had been very expensive ; Philip therefore taxed all the *remaining* Moors until he had got enough to pay the expense of transporting them also ; and then he finished his work. Some few Moors were supposed to have concealed themselves, and a prize therefore was set on their heads, as if they had been wolves. In this way did Philip in the course of a few months expel at least *a million* of industrious, ingenious, innocent, loyal subjects.

When such were the proceedings of the House of Austria towards Spain, we cannot wonder that Spain has been on the decline for more than three centuries. Her decline may be dated in fact from the day when Charles of Ghent, their first sovereign of that House, made war on the constitution of Castile ; though the impulse to prosperity which the old free institutions had given, disguised for a generation the insidious mischief of despotism. The decay was manifested before Philip II. was dead ; and ruin is hardly too strong a word for the state of things which Philip III. induced.

XI.—AUSTRIAN POLAND.

THE greatest crime of the eighteenth century was the partition of Poland, by the joint force of Russia, Prussia, and Austria, with the aid of a weak king who had been forced on to the throne of Poland by the intrigues and violence of Russia. In this infamous plot the religious Empress-Queen Maria Theresa would at first take no part; but at length, on finding that to oppose it was Quixotic, while to be neutral was to incur guilt and lose its payment, she became an eager partner to the conspiracy, and claimed Polish Galicia as *part of the kingdom of Hungary*, to which it once belonged.

Yet in fact, after conquering it by force, she held it by force, and did not reunite it to Hungary, nor impart to it any of the Hungarian freedom. It might be wrong to speak of the House of Hapsburg as violating any express engagements, oaths, or treaties, with their Galician subjects; who appear, from the day of the conquest, to have been pressed down under pure military domination. Reciprocally, however, since no moral union has arisen between these Poles and the House of Austria, they are surely justified in shaking off such a yoke whenever they are able.

The miseries of Poland rose out of the fact that the commonalty was enthralled to a caste of military nobles; and all attempts at reform were embarrassed by the intrigues and violence of Russia, who extorted a treaty, which, under the name of protecting the rights of the republic, gave her a pretext to forbid their reforming the injustices of their own institutions. Galicia partook in this misery. Indeed the commonalty are largely of a different race, called Ruthenians; who have no happy and patriotic traditions concerning the ancient Polish freedom. The Polish nobility has long understood the evil and danger hence arising; but since Austria, as a fixed part of her policy, keeps up enmities between the different races and classes in her empire, it has been impossible for the Polish nobles to destroy offensive feudalism, unless they could first get rid of Austrian interference.

In the year 1846 a conspiracy was formed, the nature and extent of which is differently represented. Some call it a communistic scheme originating in Cracow,—supposed to have been got up by Austrian spies,—and highly offensive to the landed proprietors of Galicia. Others say that it was really an exten-

sive plan for renewing Polish independence, in which the land-holders were largely concerned, and that the Austrian Government had gained a certain knowledge of it.* The latter account appears by far the more probable: but, whatever the cause, the acts of the Austrians are not doubtful. They sent agents among the Ruthenian peasantry, to spread abroad the tale that Austria had for three years abolished forced labour, but that the nobility continued to enforce it, and were contemplating a massacre of the peasants: in turn the Government offered them headmoney for the wholesale slaughter of their nobility. The bribe was successful. Without the trouble of a war Prince Metternich's cabinet procured the assassination of all the principal men who were (or were believed to be) planning revolution; and paid the price of blood openly to the assassins. To obtain accurate details is of course difficult, when the accounts given by the suffering class are derided as *ex parte* statements, and the dynasty is wise enough to remain wholly silent. It has, however, been stated publicly and without contradiction, that the Austrian ministry entrusted the management of this butchery to Szela, a man who was in prison for setting fire to his father's house, and for another horrible crime. He was set at liberty *with other convicts*; and disguised soldiers were put under his command. Ten shillings were offered for bringing in a nobleman dead, and five shillings for one alive. A list which was made out, of the persons massacred, contained 1484 names; but it is uncertain whether this was complete. Females and children were among the murdered, and an Englishman, by name Fox.

Thus to the middle of the nineteenth century, even when not inflamed by religious bigotry, the House of Hapsburg nourishes enmity, cupidity, and ferocious murder, rather than allow a foreign people to escape from its yoke,—a people conquered by its lawless conspiracy,—a people which has never owed to it any allegiance. Even supposing that to endeavour to escape from such a yoke were in itself a moral treason, deserving of death, yet the atrocity of confounding innocent and guilty by the general proscription of a whole order of men,—the atrocity of demoralizing a whole peasantry by holding out a pecuniary bribe to assassination,—is a form of wickedness, on which it does not appear that Russia has yet ventured; a form of wickedness, which perhaps is not to be paralleled in the annals of modern Europe, except in the proceedings of the same dynasty under

* A dispatch of Metternich avows that the Government knew of the conspiracy, and purposely did not check it, in order to cut off all the Hydra's heads at one blow.

Rudolf II., as narrated above, and again in 1848 against Hungary.

It is not unimportant, to contrast the measure dealt out to *dynasties* and to *peoples* by the public men and journalists of England. When questions were put in our Parliament concerning the Galician massacres, the Queen's ministry replied in uncertain phrases of general incredulity; in consequence of which our journalists chose to treat the whole as a silly story hastily believed by an English nobleman whose name is indissolubly associated with sympathy for oppressed Poland. Time passed on, and other subjects filled the public interest: in consequence few of us to this day are aware that the guilt of the Austrian Government in Galicia is a horrible reality. We need not ask, what *would* have been said, if such a massacre had been perpetrated voluntarily by the peasants, or had been stimulated by a republican faction. We need not refer to hypothesis, or step back to the September massacres of the first French revolutions; for we can refer to recent fact. In 1848 three men were killed by exasperated multitudes, Count Latour in Vienna, Count Lamberg in Pest, Count Rossi in Rome. What was the guilt of *Rossi* according to Roman law, must here be left doubtful: certain it is, that the populace and liberal party of Rome believed him to be morally guilty of high treason against law and liberty. *Latour* was a high criminal, undeserving of mercy before any just tribunal. He had secretly stimulated rebels and robbers to invade Hungary, to burn the villages, to slaughter and torture the people. He had publicly on his word of honour disowned Jellachich, to whom he was privately sending ammunition, money, officers, and orders. As Austrian minister of war, he had given secret instructions to the Austrian officers in the Hungarian army, to fight feebly against the Serbian marauders, and rather to sacrifice the lives of their troops than gain any decisive advantage over the murderous enemy. Latour's treachery was come to light, and all Vienna knew it. He had ordered the German armies to march against Hungary, when the news arrived that his protégé Jellachich was on the march against Vienna. The Viennese populace discerned that he was attempting to crush the liberties of Hungary by German, and of Vienna by Croatian, levies; they rose infuriated, and hanged Latour in the street. A third slaughter was that of the Hungarian Count *Lamberg*, who at the mission of the Austrian dynasty accepted the unlawful and treasonable duty of becoming military dictator of Hungary, to put himself at the head of the volunteers who were assembling to repel Jellachich. The popu-

lace of Pest, discerning that this was a new attempt to play into the hand of the public enemy, killed Lamberg on his way to occupy the fortress of Buda.

Because Rossi was stabbed in Rome, therefore, Roman liberties are to be annihilated, and a temporal Papacy to be kept on the shoulders of the Romans by the aid of foreign armies. Because Latour was hanged in Vienna, that city is to be bombarded, its citizens butchered in heaps, and the constitution, to which the Emperor had given solemn assent, is to be ignored. Because Lamberg was slain on the bridge of Buda Pest, all Hungary is to be laid waste by Russo-Austrian power, its ancient law prostrate, its indisputable rights exploded. Such is the logic of leading journalists and of our stock-exchange : is it possible to believe it to be that of the Queen's ministry also ?

Even after the massacres of Galicia were perfectly well known, not one court in Europe protested against them, not one royal or diplomatic person withdrew from amity and courtesy with the murderers. If "Red" republicans in the crudeness of passion kill a few eminently guilty men who cannot be reached by form of law, our respectable classes and our statesmen shudder at popular wickedness, and look on it as a justification of any amount of royal violence. But if an Austrian cabinet arms nightly assassins to butcher families in their homes, the news is first denied and derided, then prudently hushed up ; finally our ministry avow that whatever weakens the Austrian dynasty would be a European calamity.

XII.—HUNGARY.

UNDER this word a vast subject remains, which must be too summarily treated.

Castile and Aragon lost their liberties by a single campaign, so entirely were they surrounded by the overwhelming force of their legal guardian. Bohemia, though hemmed in between Germany and Hungary, was overpowered not at one effort, but by two wars. But Hungary, on the eastern frontier of Christendom, with the fortress land of Transylvania and the marshes of the Teiss as its defence, struggled for three centuries against the perfidious dynasty. To tell all its crimes in these few pages is impossible.

Ferdinand of Austria was freely elected king of Hungary in

1526-7; and from that date to 1826-7 he and his royal descendants perpetually broke the Coronation Oath on many most cardinal points. To use the recent words of Count Teleki, all the sovereigns of this dynasty have been perjured, except Leopold II., who reigned only 18 months, and Joseph II., who, in order to evade the oath, refused to be crowned, and thereby made himself a foreign usurper and not a legitimate king. All his acts were for this reason declared invalid by himself on his deathbed.

The pertinacious breaches of the Coronation Oath, were principally the following; 1. *protracted non-residence in Hungary.* Against the positive words of the law, all the kings of this line were permanent absentees, and most of them never lived a week on Hungarian soil. Unfaithfulness on this point is that which estranged them, and eminently led to all their other offences. 2. *The appointing of foreigners to civil and military office.* This has been done flagrantly and perpetually, in spite of perpetual remonstrance. 3. *Introducing of foreign troops, making public treaties, and declaring war, without leave of the Diet.* 4. *Neglecting to summon the Diet once in every three years at least.* 5. *Oppression of the Protestants, against specific treaties.*

This violation of law and oaths was carried out in administrative details in a great variety of instances, even at the best time; nevertheless the fortune of Hungary has been very different under different kings; and we proceed to mark out the general distinctions.

The three hundred years, from 1526 to 1826, is divisible into two periods at 1712, which is the year of the peace of Satmar. The first period, from 1526 to 1712, is one of civil war against the kings so frequent as to be almost unceasing. The sufferings from foreign soldiery were great, even in peace, from the beginning of the Austrian sway: horrible desolation followed under Rudolf II., a pupil of the Jesuits, and continued as long as Jesuits had the educating of the Austrian princes. In this long period of 186 years the liberties of Hungary were saved by a twofold support,—first, by great princes of Transylvania, men of genius and wisdom, as well as of unchanging resolution;—secondly, by the Turks; who, though hostile to Hungary as Christian, were soon discovered to be far milder masters than the House of Hapsburg.—In the beginning of those times fifteen-sixteenths of the Magyars were Protestant. The Turks did not interfere with their religion: Rudolf II. and Ferdinand II. tried to murder every Protestant whom they could not convert.—The Turks did not interfere with local self-govern-

ment, but were satisfied with moderate tribute and nominal homage: the Austrians could be satisfied with nothing short of rooting out all the institutions of Hungary, local as well as religious.—The Turks observe treaties as faithfully as any nation of Christendom: the Austrians in that whole period never observed the treaties by which again and again and again they made peace with Hungary. Yet the English apologists of Austria* talk of her as having saved Hungary from the Turkish yoke!

Besides the aid from the Transylvanian princes and the Turks, the Hungarians had relief in the attacks made on Austria by the French power. The victories of Blenheim and Ramilles went far to seal the doom of Hungary under the feet of Austria. But the Jesuits had fallen into disgrace, and the heir apparent of the Hapsburgs had been educated under other tuition. For the first time the Hungarians experienced generous treatment from that House, under Joseph I. who, preferring a loyal people to one conquered, crushed and resisting, made† with them the celebrated peace of Satmar, which confirmed their ancient law and liberties, and gave to his dynasty the loyal obedience of the Hungarians for another full century. This peace was negotiated with the cognizance and by the mediation of an English and of a Dutch Ambassador.

It may be here proper to indicate what are the proofs of this fact, since an English Foreign Minister has recently avowed that *England knows nothing of Hungary but as part of the Austrian Empire*. In Archdeacon Coxe's History of the House of Austria, ch. 79, which treats of the years from 1705 to 1711, we read:—“Joseph I. redoubled his efforts to pacify the insurgents [*i. e.* the Hungarian nation]. He opened a new negotiation *through the intervention of the English and Dutch ministers*, at Tirnau, &c.” No farther details appear in Coxe, but in Dr. J. A. Fessler's German History of Hungary, vol. 9, p. 584, and in Prince Rakotzy's *Histoire des Revolutions en Hongrie*, vol. 2, pp. 341–346, we find the following facts. The preliminaries for the peace, as Coxe states, began at Tirnau (or Nagy Szombat), which was in 1705; on the 13th October the conferences were opened between Count Wratislaw (chancellor of Bohemia) and Archbishop Paul Szechenyi, as representatives of the Emperor Joseph I. and

* In fact, the deplorable misgovernment of Hungary by Austria almost led to the conquest of *both* countries by the Turks. Vienna was saved from them, only by Sobiesky, king of Poland, A.D. 1683, who thereby enabled Leopold I. to inflict horrible miseries on Hungary. The “Bloody Shambles” of Eperies were held in 1687.

† The treaty was not actually signed till after the death of Joseph.

the Counts Bercsényi and Csáky as delegates of the Hungarian "Confederation," as the provisional Government of Hungary called itself. Coxe has explained its organization. All the peers, prelates, and representatives of the counties and cities of insurgent Hungary assembled in Diet at Szecseny, and after religious ceremonies from the Archbishop of Gran, instituted a Confederacy similar to that of Poland. The administration was confided to a Senate of 24 members, Rakotzy was elected Leader and elevated on a buckler by the principal peers: after which an oath of fidelity was taken, and a vow not to conclude peace until their *ancient rights* were restored. As Mediator at the Conference, the English Government sent the *Earl of Sunderland*, then ambassador, to the Emperor, and *Sir George Stepney*, the secretary to the embassy; also the Dutch Government sent their ambassador Baron Rechteren, and Heer Hamel Bruyninx. It deserves particular remark, that the Confederation objected to the credentials of the Earl of Sunderland, as implying censure of the insurgent Hungarians; since in them Queen Anne assigned as a reason for her mediation her wish to stop farther bloodshed in an *inglorious struggle*. The credentials were accordingly altered by the English Government, which finally assumed a place as mediating between two INDEPENDENT powers. The negotiations continued for five or six years. When they had been broken off, in the winter of 1705–6, the Mediators took the initiative themselves, in a note of Jan. 15th, 1706, to exhort the Emperor and the Confederation to renew the negotiation. In conclusion the Mediators did not indeed pretend to guarantee the Hungarian constitution: being Maritime Powers, this was not desired of them. But undoubtedly they had full official cognizance of the terms of the reconciliation;—they knew that the Emperor submitted to recognize the whole ancient constitution of Hungary, and all its laws passed with legitimate formalities; and they have been perfectly aware that the House of Austria cannot violate the treaty of Satmar, without de-throning itself in Hungary, and putting the English Government in the same position towards insurgent Hungary now, as it was in 1705–12.

In 1687 the Hungarian Diet (under military compulsion, it seems) had voted to make the crown hereditary in the male line; and this was not disturbed by the peace of Satmar. But the heir of the crown still was not king until he had been legitimately crowned, which implied his first taking the Coronation Oath. Besides this, ever since 1622, the Hungarians have forced their kings, prior to coronation, to execute a Charter, or,

as it is called, an *Inaugural Diploma*, (a document in some respect similar to the Bohemian *Reversal*,) which was a personal covenant of every king with the nation. Yet neither has this had any effect. Maria Theresa saved her kingdoms from a conspiracy of the great powers, by the zealous enthusiasm of the Hungarians, in 1741, yet she too was false. In her long reign she summoned the Diet but three times, and, against oath, ruled by Edicts. She renewed a solemn law, that the ministers of state *both for internal and for foreign affairs* should be Hungarians; but she made her Hungarian ministry a sham and a blind, and ruled by means of her Austrian cabinet. This Queen subtly undermined and corrupted Hungarian self-government and Hungarian religion: her whole policy was directed to evade the law, where she did not dare openly to defy it. Her son Joseph II. went further. He refused to take the Coronation Oath, and usurped power without that solemn engagement. He suppressed the municipalities and county institutions of Hungary, and introduced a centralized system of paid German officials, of course by means of foreign troops. When at last the much-enduring Hungarians rose to resist usurpations so undisguised, Joseph did not dare to persevere, since in Belgium and against Turkey he was alike unprosperous. On his deathbed, in 1790, he retracted all his offensive ordinances. His brother Leopold II. pacified the nation by solemn renewals of the Constitution with additional guarantees.* His wise administration during a short reign of 18 months roused enthusiasm for the Crown, and effectually dissipated all jealousy of its encroachments.

But Leopold was suddenly cut off, as is not doubted, by domestic poison, and as the Hungarians have suspected,—in order to introduce the old imperial policy. His young son Francis, under evil guidance, and terrified by the scenes of republican Paris, soon recommenced illegal arrests, illegal sentences, and cruel executions. Yet Hungary nobly supported him against France. But when the Diet, in 1807, inveighed

* The constitutional laws to which Leopold gave consent, were virtually a renewal of solemn treaty between the nation and the dynasty. Among others: "Hungary, with its appanages, is a free and independent kingdom, that is, compromised with no other kingdom or people, and to be governed by its hereditary king, when legitimately crowned, after its own peculiar laws and customs, and not after the fashion of the other provinces." Also: "His Majesty will call in Hungarians to the very Ministry of State, and will treat of internal affairs by means of Hungarians, and foreign affairs with an admixture of Hungarians." Also: "No taxes or service shall be levied without permission of the Diet, except during foreign invasion. Diets shall be held at least once in three years."

against maladministration of the finances, and moved in favour of Free Trade,—and again, in 1812, protested against the Austrian State-Bankruptcy,—Francis resolved to get rid of the constitution. The war came to an end, and he summoned no more Diets until compelled, after 13 years' interval. Meanwhile, he had done or attempted numerous illegalities, especially that of raising men and money by his edict. In 1824 he became terrified by the aspect of things, and in 1825 a Diet was summoned; and in this one respect the law was thenceforward observed until 1848. In consequence, that was a period of legal warfare by open constitutional means for the destruction of the many illegalities in which the Court still persisted. In fact, a large part of the duty of the Diet still consisted in opposing encroachments of the prerogative, and complaining that the law was not enforced by the ministry. This was in itself a great hindrance to internal reform, by occupying time and energy. But besides, it was the craft of the Crown to impede all reform which would content the un-Magyar population and cement them into a single nationality. By Edicts, now and then, good measures were sought to be enforced: then the Diets and Aristocracy and County Assemblies had either to submit to a precedent highly dangerous to constitutional liberty, or to expose themselves to the imputation of being hostile to all reform. Even smaller improvements of the law were thwarted or vetoed by the Crown, unless the Diet were willing to purchase them by assenting to some evil principle. Thus at quite a recent period a veto was put on a bill for expediting the adjudicature of commercial transactions, unless the judges were made mere nominees of the Crown, without any of their usual responsibility. Nor was it possible for the “nobiles,”* or patricians, to tax themselves for roads, bridges, and other material improvements; for every such bill was thwarted by the Crown insisting that all the proceeds of the new taxes should be made over to it irresponsibly: and the Hungarians had proof in their vast Crown Estates, (which were all unprofitable in Austrian hands,) that to vote money to the Crown was useless. The Austrian ministry used the Crown Estates of Hungary as a job of patronage for themselves; reproached the Hungarians for the backward state of their country; refused to allow its improvement, unless they (a purely foreign body) had the doing of it; and lastly, by their scribes and jour-

* The “nobiles” were a class who paid no direct taxes, but were liable to personal service in war. These must not be confounded with the “mag-nates,” or peers.

nalists did not cease to poison the mind of Europe with the idea of Hungarian "barbarism."

A series of valuable laws were prepared by the Opposition in the autumn of 1847; and several of them had been carried, when the French Republic broke on the world in Feb. 1848. The Hungarians immediately feared a new war of the despotic powers against France, and a recurrence of their old miseries;—the Crown ruling without Diets, and excusing itself by its pretended privilege to raise troops and taxes *when there was danger of invasion*. All felt that an onward move was essential, to secure their hereditary laws.

The timid Conservatives of the Diet, who desired the same measures as the Opposition, but, from long experience of the desperate atrocity of the Court, feared to press it too hard, now felt sure that the dynasty would give way to their just demands. The Galician massacres had exceedingly terrified the selfish part of the great proprietors, and made all to feel the extreme importance of terminating feudal quarrels. In consequence, the whole Diet came over to the side of the Opposition, and Batthyanyi and Kossuth found themselves leaders of a united nation. Kossuth proposed a *petition* to the king, which was carried unanimously, to restore that political condition which had subsisted when Hungary elected its first king of the House of Hapsburg, viz. by re-establishing parliamentary power in the other kingdoms—Bohemia and Vienna. All felt that the extinction of liberty in them was the permanent cause of mischief to Hungary; and a large deputation from both Chambers carried the petition to Vienna, where an unforeseen result quickened the deliberations of the Court. The Viennese took heart at the events of Paris and the debates in Hungary, and made insurrection: the same had also taken place in Italy: the tottering dynasty gladly crept beneath the shadow of Kossuth, and gave solemn assent to the splendid series of legislative and administrative reforms.

But while making oath to Hungary, the royal House was plotting to break the oath; and betook themselves as in Galicia to ferocious craft. Agents were sent to stimulate the Serbs to make murderous inroads into Hungary. Jellachich was made Governor of Croatia *before* Batthyanyi had received the formal investment as premier, and then it was pretended that Batthyanyi's concurrence was not needed. Jellachich preached French republicanism, stirred up the Croats to rebel, used military terrorism to pack the Croatian provincial Assembly with men hostile to Hungary, and raised an army to march against the Hungarian

capital. It was for some time a mystery why the Hungarian troops were so very ill led against the murderous Serbs : this was afterwards explained, when they found the Serbs to be under the command of Austrian officers, with the Emperor's commission. On July 2nd the Palatine Archduke Stephen opened the new Diet in the King's name ; denounced the Serbian and Croatian movements as *revolts*, and *exhorted the Diet to take active measures for suppressing them*. With the least possible delay they voted bills for raising money and troops ; but after two months had been spent in various ways, the King *put his veto on the bills*, without assigning any reason, though a deputation of 100 members of the Diet went to Vienna to implore his assent. It was already manifest to all that the Court was perfidious. The generals in the Hungarian army had been tampered with to fight feebly against the Serbs. Jellachich, who had been proclaimed a rebel, was now declared to have "proved his unalterable fidelity to the House of Hapsburg ;" finally, his despatches to Latour were intercepted, which revealed everything even to the populace of Vienna.

When dangers so extreme surrounded Hungary,—when her trained troops were nearly all abroad, and her generals (reared in Austrian service) proved treacherous,—when the heart of Batthyanyi failed, and all feared the fate of Bohemia,—one man saved the honour of Hungary, and with her honour her whole future. Kossuth called the people to arms. Volunteers assembled, defeated Jellachich, captured his rearguard of 10,000 men, with stores and ammunition ; raised Hungary into enthusiasm, but drove the perjured Hapsburgs into still more headlong courses.

On the arrival of the news, orders were sent to the Austrian forces to invade Hungary from all sides. A royal rescript was signed by Ferdinand on October 3rd which *dissolved the Diet, forbade all action of the municipalities, superseded all tribunals by martial law, and made JELLACHICH civil and military governor of Hungary, vesting in him an expressly-unlimited despotism, and giving him power of life and death*. Such an act, even from the legitimately-crowned king of Hungary, was not merely in all parts null and void, but was equivalent *ipso facto* to an abdication, since it was a rescinding of that constitution which made him king : yet the Hungarians did not, even so, declare the crown forfeited ; they merely prepared to resist the illegality.

The war which followed is in itself a history. The barbarous burnings, slaughterings, and tortures inflicted by the Serbs were

presently backed up by similar ferocities of the Wallacks in Transylvania, stirred up by Austrian officers. Yet the devoted self-sacrifice of Hungary triumphed. In March, 1849, seven great victories were won by them in the open field against the trained armies and the most experienced generals of Austria. In April the host of 150,000 men which had invaded the country was everywhere in rapid retreat, shattered and disorganized.

King Ferdinand was an imbecile, little removed from an idiot; but he was morally too good for the convenience of the dynasty. He had refused in November to sign the commissions for invading Hungary, because such an act was a breach of his Coronation Oath.—He had in consequence been dethroned by a secret cabal, his abdication having been extorted from him by his family and some of the cabinet. The same conspirators placed on the throne his young nephew Francis Joseph, a pupil of the Jesuits, who being only 18 years old, and having taken no Coronation Oath, would be a pliant tool of the "camarilla," or secret cabinet. Moreover the Czar Nicholas had been importuned to give aid in Transylvania, if requisite; and in preparation for this, he violated the neutrality of Turkey by invading Moldavia and Wallachia in November and December, 1848. Soon after, when Bem gained successes in Transylvania, the Russians entered with 20,000 men; all of whom were shortly driven out again. The Austrian cabinet pretended to the European powers that the Russians had *not* come at their invitation, *but at the request of the Saxon towns* of Transylvania, to save them from Bem's "atrocities," and not with any political object, but solely "in the cause of humanity." This pretence was admitted so courteously* by France and England, that Russia perfectly discerned she would meet no impediment from either power.

Early in April it was notorious that the Russian armies were on their march, at the avowed invitation of the Hapsburgs. The Hungarian nation, having already victoriously earned its independence, proclaimed that House to have forfeited the crown, and made Kossuth governor during the continuance of the struggle. Even with the aid of Serbs and Croats and the entire disposable force of Russia, Austria could not have been saved without the treachery of the Hungarian general Gorgey, who might have dictated peace in Vienna before the Russians could have time to enter. But perfidy has triumphed. The House of

* The Russian armies had occupied the Turkish provinces before the Saxon towns had ever heard the name of Bem, and a month before Kossuth sent him on his mission into Transylvania.

Austria has consummated the darling object of her ambition,—to annihilate the laws and liberty of Hungary. Nobody now knows what is law there. If a man is arrested in his bed and carried to prison by night, it is a political offence in his wife to tell next day that he has been so treated. Rights of property, rights of law, rights of religion, rights of speech, are all gone : the taxgatherer, the hangman, and the soldier domineer over the nation which in 1809 resisted the enticing of Napoleon I. to forsake their unworthy king.

XIII.—CROATS AND SERBS.

THE reader may be at a loss to imagine, by what ingenuity the Austrian cabinet induced the Croats and Serbs to act so fierce and dreadful a part against Hungary. These races have been purposely kept in barbarism by Austria, in order to furnish her with an unlimited supply of soldiers, who are pressed into her armies by conscription ; and along what is called “the military frontier” were deprived of all the liberties of Hungary. This illegality was one of the standing grievances perpetually complained of by the Diet: yet the Austrian officers and agents had so long laid the blame of every evil on the “tyranny of the proud Magyars,” that the ignorant people believed it. The Serbs are of the Greek Church, and have been protected by the Hungarian Diet from the persecutions of Catholic Austria ; yet a Serbian patriarch, from hostility of religion and race, proved a supple tool to the Hapsburgs in stirring up the fierce and wild people to deeds of blood and plunder.

But it was necessary also to act on their political ambition. Jellachich, as we have said, at the mission of the Austrian cabinet preached “Liberty, Fraternity, Equality,” in Croatia, promising to the silly Croats that they, instead of “the proud Magyars,” should be the dominant race in Hungary,—and this, at a moment when the Diet had just extorted Ferdinand’s assent to laws which put all races on a perfect* equality. Similar

* The use of the Magyar language in the Hungarian Diet was no violation of equality; for some one language was necessary to be selected. In former days it was Latin, which, being a dead language, was much harder to acquire than the Magyar; and was sustained by the Austrians merely because it impeded eloquence and persuasion, and stopped all reform. The Croats did not object to the use of Magyar in the Central Diet; but when

absurdities deceived the Serbs. Instead of being subjected to the Diet of Hungary, they were to be a nation of themselves, in direct communication with the great Emperor at Vienna, and were to be free from the dishonour of waiting on the good pleasure of a Hungarian ministry. In the firm belief that Austria was eager to strengthen their nationality and their local privileges, and exalt them above the Magyars, these rude nations entered upon their fratricidal missions,—the Serbs ferociously, the Croats stupidly. Civil Croatia has many educated classes, and the Croatian provincial Assembly well understood the true state of things. Jellachich could do nothing with it, till he had reconstituted it by violence; his partizans were the young republicans, or the uneducated boors. The Serbs are a more energetic race, but more entirely barbarous.

No sooner was the war ended, than both nations discovered that they had been made cats-paws. The exaltation promised them by Austria proved to be community of depression: every particle of freedom which they previously enjoyed has been taken away, and at last they understand that the Magyars were their friends and protectors. This is a lesson which will not be lost upon them at the next commotion.

XIV.—THE STADION CONSTITUTION.

THE Bohemians have been similarly deluded. By the machinations of the Austrian cabinet they also were seduced into the stupid idea, that the Hapsburgs were willing to establish a constitutional rule, in which the Slavonic element would prevail. By playing on this Bohemian vanity, the cabinet controlled the votes of the Viennese Parliament, in August and September, 1848, and prevented it from espousing the cause of Hungary against the treacherous Austrian ministers, or even receiving a communication from the Hungarian Diet which appealed to it as mediator. The Bohemians were amused by the promise of a

Latin was laid aside, they wished to use the Croatian, and not the Magyar, in their own province; and this, after long debates, *was finally conceded to them* by the Diet. It had previously been refused to them by the Crown.

Englishmen do not think they are oppressive to Wales, in claiming that English, and not Welsh, shall be talked in the London Parliament. That German and English journalists make it a great sin in the Magyars, to have “oppressed the Croatian language,” testifies how little argument that side has.

new and comprehensive constitution, which would fuse all Hungary into the Austrian Empire, and give an enormous preponderance to the Sclavonic races; among which the Bohemian, as the most highly educated, would forsooth be dominant.

This constitution was given to the world,—on paper, in the opening of March, 1849, having been signed by the young Emperor after the battle of Kápolna (Feb.), which was lost by Görgey's disobedience, and was accepted as the final blow to Magyar liberty. This paper-constitution is known by the name of Count Stadion, then Austrian Home Secretary. It provided a Parliament at Vienna, in which Italians, Austrians, Bohemians, Galicians, Magyars, Croats, Serbs, Wallacks, &c., &c., should sit together. The Sclavonians were told that they would have a clear majority in it, and the Magyars were assured that it was a far better constitution than the old one of which they were so absurdly enamoured. All municipalities were abolished, and bureaucracy made universal; so that Hungary would be governed by German paid officials.

This absurd and arbitrary scheme, commencing with the avowal “Hungary exists no longer,” roused those Magyars who previously had been lukewarm,—the ultra-tories of Hungary: but it prolonged the delusion of the Bohemians, who indeed well deserved to be cheated. This constitution did its work, in keeping the Bohemians firm to Austria until the Austro-Russian armies had annihilated the liberty of Hungary. Nothing more was said of the constitution for near two years; and then,—the young Emperor proclaimed its abolition!

Thus Austria cheats her foolish tools equally with her legal and loyal subjects, and proclaims to all Europe that a weapon of her rule is low trickery as well as fierce perfidy. The bombardment of Prague had been forgiven by the Bohemians, in their eagerness for Sclavonic supremacy. It remains to be seen what new bait for their credulity the craft of the Hapsburgs will invent.

XV.—AUSTRIAN ITALY.

IN the year 1508, Maximilian I., in the infamous league of CAMBRAI, agreed to divide the territories of Venice, his ally, with his enemy Louis XII. of France. The Pope and the King of Naples took their share in the spoil. By this measure the House of Austria got possession of Dalmatia.

The Milanese territory fell into the grasp of Charles of Ghent,—in the era at which Italy was placarded to all Europe as the prize of the strongest,—and it continued with the Spanish Hapsburgs until their race was superseded by the Bourbons on the throne of Spain. After the war of the Spanish succession, the great powers decided (A.D. 1713) that Austria must have the Milanese. She has kept it for her own convenience ever since.

In the French republican war, the Austrian and the French armies trespassed at pleasure on the neutral territory of Venice, and plundered it alternately. In 1797 Bonaparte made with Austria the league of CAMPO FORMIO, by which Austria ceded to France both Belgium and the Milanese, and received in compensation—half the possessions of Venice, a power whose neutrality they had forcibly compromised. Environed by their joint forces, Venice could not resist. The Austrians, on entering, banished all persons known for patriotism and spirit, as if they had been rebels against a legitimate Government. In the close of 1805, they were forced to yield to Bonaparte both Venetia and Dalmatia: nevertheless, on the fall of Bonaparte, when the French troops had been expelled by the active exertions of the Italians, Austria marched-in her armies and occupied these territories as her inalienable right.

Now for the first time, as far as we are aware, she assumed constitutional pretences towards Italy. It was indeed the renewed age of fictitious constitutionalism. England was at the height of her reputation. Her inexhaustible resources, the unchangeableness of her policy, the safety and grandeur of her Crown, seemed all to be linked with her parliamentary constitution. By promising a renewal of the ancient national rights, modified only by new necessities, the German princes had reanimated their people. Sicily still retained her old, but reformed, Parliament: similar institutions were promised to Naples and Piedmont, and Austria felt the need of hypocrisy in the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom. In effect, England did give to France under the restored Bourbons a parliamentary Government, and Alexander guaranteed a highly-liberal constitution to the kingdom of Poland; which made it decorous for us to accept and sign the Treaty of Vienna. At that crisis, the voice of England, if it had been raised against the treachery of the kings, would have armed all Germany, Poland, and Italy. To win our consent was essential to Austria, Prussia, and Russia, and it proved very easy.

Austria at this time engaged to govern Lombardy and Venetia

as Italian nationalities constitutionally united to her crown, and drew up into schedule, as a sort of Charter, the constitution which was to be established. The army was to be strictly national, all the officers as well as privates being Italians, except a few of the chief generals. The entire of the civil service also were to be Italians, except the viceroys and a few eminent officials. The National Universities were to be under Italian Professors. There were to be Representative Assemblies with freedom of speech, and the right of receiving petitions against any malversations of the Executive. Freedom of the press was guaranteed under fixed legal regulations. In short, it was proclaimed, that the National Independence, *which had been oppressed by Napoleon*, was now to be recovered.

Besides all this, the Austrian dynasty won for itself at that crisis the active support of the nobility of Lombardy, by promising to them definite privileges which might not be secured, if, by heading a purely republican movement, they were to expel the Austrians. The English plenipotentiary was easily amused by verbal promises, and possibly only wanted an excuse for gratifying the imperial friends who showered on him presents of diamonds.

But no sooner was Austria in full possession, than the Italians discovered that every single promise was a trick and a falsehood. The executive Government indeed was for five or six years mild. The press and speech were practically free and many personal favours were shown to individual nobles; but not one of the institutions guaranteed to them was established. Like the "Stadion Constitution," they were never intended to exist, except on paper. The nobility were the first to be discontented,—as uniformly happens with those whom Austria makes her tools; and in 1820, when constitutional revolt broke out in Naples and Sicily, the Italian patricians of the north began to plot similar movements. In 1821 was the arrest of Silvio Pellico, Confalonieri, and other noblemen; and thenceforward the rule of Austria has been one of undisguised military violence.

The Italian movements for freedom, during 1846 and 1847, under the auspices of Pope Pius IX., reached Lombardy as well as Naples, Sicily, Tuscany, and Sardinia. The people of Milan endeavoured to coerce the Government into liberal measures by the most inoffensive of all forms of battle,—by abstaining from tobacco, snuff, and the lottery, which brought revenue into the imperial coffers. Marshal Radetsky, the Austrian commander, avowed the doctrine that "three days of bloodshed yield thirty years of peace," and in order to infuriate the soldiery, a hand-

bill full of insults and threats against them was concocted and printed by the police, which purported to be from the Milanese. On the 3rd of January, cigars and brandy were abundantly given to the soldiers, who at last in the evening, when sufficiently drunk, were sent out into the streets with drawn swords, and attacked whomever they met. Sixty-one persons were carried off, severely or mortally wounded, to the hospitals ; the police having previously given orders to prepare carriages and beds. Some of the sufferers, who recovered, were doomed to imprisonment as malefactors,—probably because they would otherwise have been thenceforward dangerous enemies. The Marquess D'Azeglio, since prime minister of Sardinia, adds : “ I at first believed it to be a calumny,—until I was forced to admit the fact,—that *the wounds of the prisoners remained undressed* ; in consequence of which, two of them died of gangrene, and the rest underwent extreme danger.”

Five days afterwards, another military outrage was committed in Pavia, and others in other garrisons ; this being, it seems, the Austrian mode of quelling the spirit of insurrection. But naturally, when the French revolution came in February, the result was, an uprising in Lombardy. Vienna was simultaneously revolutionized. Radetsky, who had been beaten out of Milan, received orders from Vienna to make peace. He disobeyed orders, rightly judging that the royal House would thank him for opposing a ministry which they had unwillingly accepted. Yet even so late as July, the Hapsburgs kept up their renewed pretexts of constitutionalism and nationality. On the 22nd of that month, the Archduke John opened the assembly at Vienna in the name of the Emperor, with a speech breathing amity and goodwill towards all parts of the Empire, and said of Italy in particular :* “ The war in Italy is not directed against the liberties of the people of that country. Its real object is, to maintain the honour of the Austrian arms in presence of the Italian Powers, *at the same time recognizing their nationality.*” The result shows, that this, as on every other occasion, was a mere cheat and a blind, intended at the moment to win over a party among the Italians, as also among Hungarians and Bohemians,—to

* The Hungarian Diet, and Kossuth personally, have been reproached by opposite parties on opposite grounds, in the matter of the Hungarian levies against Italy. Lord Ponsonby, and our official underlings and journals, attack the Hungarians for *not* giving troops against Italy ; Liberals (including even Mr. Walter Kelly) have attacked them for *giving* troops. These opposite accusations may surely neutralize one another. The real facts are too complicated to be accurately stated in the compass of a note.

satisfy the constitutional aspirations still dominant in Vienna, and to separate England from sympathy with the Sardinian arms. Possibly the Archduke John was personally sincere; but in such a dynasty, the good intentions of one prince are powerless.—To tell the horrors that Austria has since perpetrated, is here impossible and needless. But her first act on entering Milan is a comment on her respect for *Italian nationality*. An edict was issued that *all the men* found in Milan *between 18 and 40 years*, after 8 o'clock in the evening, should be immediately enrolled in the *Croat regiments*, and sent across the mountains. Less than 12 hours was allowed for those who preferred exile and destitution. After this we cannot wonder that the Italian exiles are counted by tens of thousands.

All diplomacy is false and unjust, which pretends that the Austrian dynasty is a *legitimate Government* in Lombardy. A power, which dates its possession of a country from a century back without any growth of loyal sentiment;—which in the last 38 years has made itself more and more hated by every class; a power which has falsified every solemn and public declaration, and stands only by overwhelming armies of foreign soldiery,—which affects moral sanctions no longer and believes in no allegiance,—is simply *at war* with the nation, and is in military occupation of its territory. Foreign statesmanship, which disguises this fact and bestows names of moral dignity on military oppression, tends to accumulate hatred against *all royal persons* as mutual supporters of one another without any regard to moral right or wrong.

When a nation is crushed by foreign armies, as northern Italy now by Austria, any third power strong enough to interfere in favour of the oppressed needs no other moral justification than to point to the bare state of the facts. But if its own diplomacy has disguised those facts, it becomes exceedingly hard for it so to act as justice, humanity, and farsighted wisdom require. The strength of despots is in diplomacy, through which they paralyze the support of right by its only possible guardians. Since the days of Demosthenes and of Philip of Macedon, it has been notorious to all educated men, that the despot, who communicates his counsels to none, who is master of the whole resources of his nation, who pursues his plans undeviatingly but secretly,—has infinite advantages over free States both in negotiation and in the first outbreak of war. The only means of resisting him, is by rallying popular enthusiasm. But this is made difficult or impossible by free States, when they are so senseless as to allow any communications with him to be secret.

XVI.—SICILY.

A FEW words on Sicily are here appropriate, though that country has long ceased to be an Austrian possession. Its calamities nevertheless recommenced from a marriage of its king into the House of Austria.

After the war of the Spanish succession, the moral dignity of the Sicilians was severely wounded by the mode in which they were handed from Spain to Savoy and from Savoy to Austria at the pleasure of the great powers: and in 1734, when the Bourbon Philip V. of Spain reconquered Naples, the Sicilians aided him to expel the Austrians from Sicily also. His son, Don Carlos, was received gladly as king of Naples and of Sicily,—two crowns, with two nationalities,—and with him begins the constitutional reign of the Bourbons over “the two Sicilies,” as the kingdoms were called. Sicily had retained all her ancient institutions, which date as far back as those of England; and from 1734 till nearly the end of the century she advanced in slow but steady improvement and general prosperity. The fatal change came, when her king Ferdinand married Caroline of Austria, and by the influence of the Emperor Francis commenced attacks on the Constitution. It was saved, first, by the vigour of the Sicilians, and secondly, by the arms of England, who, after the marriage of Napoleon with Maria Louisa of Austria, discerned that the King of Sicily was become a mere tool of France. We therefore aided *the nation* against *the King* of Sicily; and after many months’ negotiation, the King in 1812 took solemn oath to certain reforms and a new charter adapted to strengthen the public liberties. When we withdrew from the island on the fall of Napoleon, our ambassador issued a proclamation that England was the ally and friend of *the Sicilian nation, and the protectress and supporter* of the recent reform. Nevertheless, immediately after the Congress of Vienna, in consequence of a secret treaty between Austria and Naples, the King overthrew the constitution and reigned despotically. England did not even protest! In 1820 Sicily rose against her usurping King; so did Naples; and constitutional royalty was re-established. But Austria, in fulfilment of the secret treaty, marched her armies in, and overthrew the liberty of both the Sicilies. Again England neither interfered, nor protested, nor lessened her demonstrations of friendship to either power.

XVII.—WHAT IS ALL THIS TO ENGLAND?

IN answer to the question, What is all this to us? we may consider what England *has* done in the matter,—what she *might have* done,—how she is *already* affected,—and what threatens her in the *future*. But lest these topics make a volume in themselves, we must be extremely concise.

1. We HAVE done much to establish the power of Austria, without once taking or asking any guarantee that the power should be well used: we therefore are not unentangled in her guilt. We played a principal part in winning for Austria, the battle of Blenheim,—which enabled her to recover her position in Hungary,—and soon after, in winning the battle of Ramilles; without which she could not have conquered the Milanese. We were mediators between her and Hungary in the treaty of Satmar, A.D. 1712, which reconciled Hungary to her crown, and guaranteed the Hungarian constitution. We were ardent allies to Maria Theresa, when the formidable conspiracy was made to despoil her of her crowns. In those wars our Government contracted a great debt, for the sake of Austria, on which our nation has ever since been paying yearly interest. In the great war against France, we lent to Austria *seventeen millions* sterling, not a shilling of which has been repaid. If we dealt with her as unceremoniously as with Lahore or Birmah, we might take possession of Lombardy and Venice in order to repay ourselves. We became parties to the treaty of Vienna, seduced (willingly or unwillingly) by fair words which promised constitutions. We thus gave our influence (at that moment immense) to establish Austria in Venice and in another slice of Poland,—territories lawlessly seized during the French war, without any shadow of historical right. It avails not to say that we were not *able* to expel any of the invaders from Italy or Poland at that moment: there was nothing to force our plenipotentiary to sign the treaty. By signing it we gave our assent to a worse despotism than Napoleon's, and, through the devotion of our statesmen to routine, we have disabled ourselves to this day for supporting European liberty and law.

2. “What *might* England have done?” Many people seem to fancy that we were powerless!—Not to run too far back, let us confine the question to the last five years. It is then safe to reply:

a. Our ministry MIGHT have published in the spring of 1848 the despatches of Mr. Blackwell, our envoy at Presburg; which in fact did not come to light till months after the fall of

Hungary, when elicited from the ministry by a motion in Parliament.—If they had been given to the public as soon as received, the English nation would have understood the cause of Hungary and the treacheries of Austria a full year earlier. If our foreign minister had, in his place in Parliament, expounded to us the happy event, that in the East of Europe a new England had arisen,—a free but royalist nation, warmly loving the example and the very name of England,—a nation which (in the words of the Archduke Charles) “sought for reform only by legal and constitutional means,”—so that while we looked with terrible interest on France, we were able to regard Hungary with cordial and joyful sympathy ;—our aristocracy would have been put into a totally different temper of mind, our journalists would never have misled the public, Hungary would have rallied to England, and Austrian ministers might have been arrested in their headlong career before the fatal months of September and October.

b. When the news arrived in October, 1848, that a royal rescript had arbitrarily annihilated the whole constitution of Hungary, which had been settled by our mediation at the peace of Satmar, and that a schism had reopened between Hungary and the Austrian crown ; we MIGHT have sent a special envoy to the Hungarian Diet, with the avowed object of endeavouring to readjust the broken treaty. The moral weight of this would possibly have constrained the wicked members of the Austrian cabinet to resign ; for it would have been at once felt impossible to disguise their guilt from all Europe. The most respectable man among them, Count Stadion, left the ministry rather than consent to call in the Russians ; and went mad irrecoverably, when he saw Austria thus cast beneath the feet of the Czar. Who shall say that our moral support of Hungary might not have made Stadion prime minister instead of Schwarzenberg ?

c. When it farther was announced that Ferdinand had abdicated in favour of his nephew, but that the Hungarians suspected fraud, and in any case held his deed to be invalid in law, (since he had no power to alter the succession to the crown, or give away the rights of his own possible children,)—we MIGHT have directed our ambassador to suspend his relations with the cabinet of Vienna, not as renouncing amity with Austria, but as denoting our uncertainty *what*, or *where*, Austria was. *If Ferdinand's act was valid in Austria and invalid in Hungary, this was a voluntary dissolution of the union of the crowns.* And if we found an opinion to prevail, that Ferdinand was removed because he would not violate his Coronation Oath, we MIGHT

have protested in the face of all Europe against an affair so damaging to the moral influences of all royalty. At any rate we knew certainly that young Francis Joseph, if admissible to the royal dignity, could not legally exercise it in Hungary until legitimately crowned. And since Hungary was the only* great constitutional royalty remaining, we had every reason of interest, sympathy, and honour to induce us to acknowledge *provisionally* her separate independence as a nation legitimately struggling for hereditary rights.—Had we done this, we MIGHT still have continued our attempts to effect a reconciliation, and have conceded to the Hungarians the same public traffic with us as was lawful to the Austrians. Our example would have been eagerly followed by the United States, and very probably by General Cavaignac; or even by his successor,—who in the early period of his career would not have wished to seem less attached to public liberties than aristocratic England. In all probability this would have forced the Austrians to peace; but if not, it would have insured victory to the Hungarians.

Instead of this, our minister did nothing *until August, 1849*, and then wrote a meek letter, offering to Austria to MEDIATE, when the Russian forces were already on the Theiss! He simply received an exceedingly insulting reply.

d. We MIGHT have protested against Russia invading the Danubian provinces of Turkey in November and December, 1848, to the sore displeasure of the Sultan. If, besides this, we had sent an ambassador to acknowledge the Hungarian Diet, it is highly doubtful whether the Russians would have ventured even on their first entrance of Transylvania, or whether the Sultan would have let them cross his frontier.

e. After Hungary had triumphantly beaten Austrians and Russians out, and had proclaimed the perfidious dynasty to have forfeited the crown for ever, we MIGHT have recognized Hungary as alike *de facto* and *de jure* independent; and have warned the Czar that we should regard a new invasion of Hungary as a breach of the law of nations, to which we could not be indifferent. The United States would have joined us in this, and Russia would not have interfered the second time.

f. When Kossuth in April, 1849, wrote to ask the English Government to give a *dynasty to Hungary*, we MIGHT have accepted his ambassador, and at least have entered into negotiations.

* Next in importance, and nearer to us in claims, was Sicily. Each is now destroyed, with its ancient nobility, and its ancient constitution. No old constitution survives in Europe, similar to that of England! Will either Whigs or Tories tell us, that such a result strengthens the throne of Victoria, or the Peerage of England?

Instead of this, our ministry refused to listen, and replied—(the words are written in the blue book)—that England knows nothing of Hungary except as “part of the Austrian Empire”! Of course this meant, as “attached to the Austrian Crown;” for the name *Empire* is very recent, and never has included Hungary. If our well-read and highly-experienced ministers can possibly have been ignorant either of the peace of Satmar or of the pacification by Leopold II., yet they were assuredly aware that the Treaty of Vienna did not *bargain away* Hungary to the crown of Austria and pledge the British Government to such a union. It barely recognized an existing fact of notorious Hungarian law,—namely, that the emperor of Austria was also legitimate king of Hungary: which left it open to us to inquire, whether the same state of facts still continues. But we resolved not to entertain the question, and, apparently, still so resolve.

g. So much we all know might have been done, *if there had been a will*. Ministers of State are farther aware, whether or not the dread of our supporting Sardinia and Venice with active force, and occupying the port of Fiume for the Hungarian Diet, might not have been plied so judiciously on the Austrian cabinet early in 1849 as to constrain them to make peace and send the Russian armies home. On such topics private men are not allowed to speak too confidently, yet we cannot help having our strong opinions. At any rate, never will unbiased history believe, that in 1848, when the Austrian dynasty was on the brink of destruction, it was not *in the power* of Great Britain to control the male and female conspirators who wielded the name of the Austrian Empire to the ruin of its independence. Never shall we be believed to have wished so well to liberty, as to the name and shadow of Hapsburg. Never will it be possible to acquit our tremblingly-conservative Government of having so dreaded the fall of an old injustice, and the possible rise of a just novelty, as to prefer to see despotism triumph by the final wreck of royal honour and loyal love, with the undisputed ascendancy of the Czar of Siberia on the banks of the Rhine and the frontier of Piedmont.

3. Now from all these dreadful events what results are come upon England?

First, a degradation of the idea of ROYALTY.—The ancient* conception of a king was noble and glorious, as the freely-ac-

* The mutuality of the bond between King and People was, in old days, expressed by the word *Liege*. He was their “liege-lord,” they were his “liege-men.” Liege is said to be related to League, as Bound is to Bond. But the modern word, “Subjects,” assimilates liege-men to conquered slaves.

cepted guardian of Law, the sacred embodiment of Right, the symbol and means of the Nation's Unity, its representative to the foreigner, and its central object of honour. Towards a king who is conceived to fulfil this idea, all Patriotism rallies, and Loyalty (or love of Law) becomes identified with devotion to the royal person and dynasty. But now, our official rulers recognize as kings and emperors, co-ordinate to our own sovereign, those who notoriously have no moral sanction whatever,—violent invaders, hated oppressors, perfidious usurpers. It cannot be too much pondered by English royalists, that he who exalts robbers into princes degrades princes into robbers. If our aristocracy, during coming events, play into the hands of despotism, they may open a gulf between the lovers of freedom in England and the devotees of false royalty, which will swallow up the throne of Queen Victoria's children.

Next, we have seen foreign conspiracy to overthrow lawful constitutions, adopted into European policy as a fixed principle. The precedent of a king, by his own forces, destroying the law which he is appointed to uphold, is sufficiently dreadful and alarming to all free nations. But since our confirmation of the later partitions of Poland in the Congress of Vienna, the unholy Alliance has systematized its work. By combining to quench liberty, they have overthrown law and right in Sicily, in Naples, in Spain, in Cracow, in Rome, in Hungary, in Hesse Cassel,—we might add, in all Germany.—Who can deny, that the liberties of every constitutional State are hereby seriously brought into peril? Especially since, by the overthrow of Hungary, all Austria is now converted into a satrapy of Russia.

4. Does any one ask, what threatens us *in the future*? Nothing is clearer. We have to dread, first, Russian and Austrian influence on the Stock Exchange, to make all our moneyed men prefer any or every subversion of right, though pregnant with final ruin to England, rather than a resistance which would lower the value of their stock by 2 per cent. We have next to fear the rage of the millions against moneyed men, and an enormous growth of doctrinaire Republicanism and Communism in various forms. We have to expect philosophical journalists expatiating on the advantages of dismembering the Ottoman dominions, and materialist friends of peace swelling the despotic influence. If despotism prevails in Europe, we shall have to fight a singlehanded war against its combined force, or resign our liberties and our Protestantism: but if despotism is overthrown in Europe, and we have not displayed genuine sympathy with freedom, we have to tremble lest it cause civil war in Ire-

land and in the Colonies, and rouse a strong republican feeling in England itself. Such are the dangers encompassing England from her unfaithfulness to law and liberty, especially in 1848 and 1849.

In those years it was not too late to save European freedom by mere diplomacy: now, to act by mere diplomacy is little else than treachery. If we desire to set up Constitutional Royalties, we must subdue the obstacles by arms, not by words. If by military and naval force we were to free Italy and Hungary, and make to those nations a present of liberty, they would, no doubt, accept it gladly in our English form. But unless we mean to go to this effort, we have no moral claim to dictate to the nations of the Continent what *form* their freedom, when they can gain it, shall assume. Unless it is to be won by our arms, it will now be necessarily republican; hence, to feel hostility to republicanism is now to feel hostility to freedom and in fact, to side with the despots, whom all the while we disgust by our freedom of speech. If, after sitting still while the great historical Constitutions of Europe were lawlessly and perfidiously destroyed, we begin to fight a new *diplomatic* war for Constitutional Royalty, we shall, as hitherto, earn the hatred of Princes and of Nations alike, and encounter severe dangers, whichever of the two combatants is ultimately victorious.

THE END.

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